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Gaming the System: Protecting Consumers 
from Unconscionable Contractual  
Forum-Selection and Arbitration Clauses 
Linda S. Mullenix* 
The Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Atlantic Marine v. U.S. District Court perhaps 
usefully resolved the issue of the appropriate procedural means for ascertaining the 
proper court where the parties’ agreement includes a forum-selection clause. However, 
the Court’s decision was predicated on the presupposition that the forum-selection 
clause was valid—a presupposition that begged that threshold question. Thus, the 
Court’s presupposition threw a significant set of antecedent questions into legal limbo, 
namely: (1) what body of law applies to evaluate the validity and enforceability of a 
forum-selection clause, (2) what court should make that determination, and (3) when 
should that determination be made? This Article explores the problem of forum-
selection, choice-of-law, and arbitration clauses in the context of the federal courts’ 
longstanding fixation on the problem of creative forum-shopping and other 
gamesmanship to gain litigation advantage, strategies the courts have long eschewed. 
Nonetheless, despite the concerted efforts of courts and legislators to thwart such 
techniques through judicial fiat and legislative enactment, actors in the judicial arena 
continue to invent resourceful methods to circumvent new constraints. This Article 
argues that consumer forum-selection and arbitration clauses ought to be viewed 
through the lens of litigation gamesmanship, as procedural means whereby corporate 
defendants are able to establish forum advantage without any countervailing benefit to 
consumers who unwittingly agree to such clauses. The Court consistently has turned a 
blind eye and deaf ear on the problem of consumer forum-selection and arbitration 
clauses, instead merging consideration of consumer agreements with jurisprudence 
developed in the dissimilar context of sophisticated business partners freely negotiating 
at arm’s length. The Court’s continued failure to distinguish and address the problem of 
consumer forum-selection and arbitration clauses—left unchanged or worsened by 
Atlantic Marine—calls for legislative action to close this legal advantage conferred on 
corporate defendants who exploit it to their economic benefit. 
 
 * Morris & Rita Atlas Chair in Advocacy, University of Texas School of Law, 
lmullenix@law.utexas.edu. 
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Introduction 
The Supreme Court loves forum-selection clauses. It has told us so 
at least four times.1 In the most recent consideration of such clauses, the 
Court in Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. U.S. District Court 
resolved a conflict among the lower federal courts concerning the 
appropriate procedural means for ascertaining the proper court in 
litigation where the parties’ agreement included a forum-selection 
clause.2 We now know that when a party invokes a forum-selection 
clause, the proper means for locating the appropriate forum is through a 
transfer of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),3 rather than through a 
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3), 12(b)(6), or 28 U.S.C. § 1406.4 In 
addition, a court’s consideration of the transfer motion is governed by the 
jurisprudence for § 1404(a) transfers, and not jurisprudential principles 
governing motions to dismiss for a lack of venue, improper venue, or 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.5 
While resolving this procedural problem, however, the Court 
notably failed to address the most vexing problems relating to litigation 
that involves forum-selection clauses: namely, what law applies to 
determine the validity and enforceability of the clause, which court 
makes that determination, and when such a determination is appropriately 
made. Thus, perhaps the Court’s most significant and important admission 
in Atlantic Marine is in footnote 5, where the Court simply noted that its 
“analysis presuppose[d] a contractually valid forum-selection clause.”6 
The Court’s unanimous decision, centering on § 1404(a) transfers, begs 
the primary question of which court should determine the validity of a 
forum-selection clause, subject to what law, and when.7 This inquiry is 
 
 1. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568 (2013); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. 
v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988); The Bremen v. 
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). Actually, the Supreme Court really, really loves forum-
selection clauses. The Court has enforced every forum-selection clause in an international contract 
that has come before it. In addition to the above decisions, see also Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. 
v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 540–42 (1995); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 640 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519–20 (1974). 
 2. See generally Sarah Sheridan, Note, Atlantic Marine v. J-Crew: The Future of Forum-
Selection Clauses in Federal Courts, 9 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y Sidebar 1 (2013); Matthew J. 
Sorensen, Note, Enforcement of Forum-Selection Clauses in Federal Court After Atlantic Marine, 
82 Fordham L. Rev. 2521 (2014); David K. Duffee et al., U.S. Supreme Court Reaffirms That Forum-
Selection Clauses Are Presumptively Enforceable, Bus. L. Today (Jan. 2014), 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/ 
blt/2014/01/keeping_current_duffee.html. 
 3. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 579–80. 
 4. Id. at 577–79. 
 5. Id. at 579–80. 
 6. Id. at 581 n.5. 
 7. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 35 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“But the 
Court’s description of the issue begs the question: what law governs whether the forum-selection clause is 
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further muddled by the Court’s determination that in cases involving 
forum-selection clauses and § 1404(a) transfers—unlike transfer cases 
not involving forum-selection clauses—the law of the forum does not 
transfer to the transferee court.8 
This Article examines the unresolved questions left open by the 
Court’s Atlantic Marine opinion, focusing on the question concerning a 
threshold determination of the validity and enforceability of forum-
selection clauses. The Court has opened the door to this inquiry by virtue 
of footnote 5. If we reject the Court’s presupposition that a forum-
selection clause is valid, then at least three legitimate questions arise: 
(1) What body of law applies to evaluate the validity and enforceability of a 
forum-selection clause? (2) What court should make that determination? 
(3) When should that determination be made? Furthermore, how might 
the answers to these possible questions intersect with the Court’s 
conclusions in Atlantic Marine? 
Part I briefly discusses the Court’s Atlantic Marine decision against 
the background of the Court’s other forum-selection clause decisions. In 
particular, it focuses on Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Stewart 
Organization v. Ricoh,9 where Justice Scalia at least seemed interested in 
the antecedent question concerning judicial determination of the validity 
and enforceability of a forum-selection clause, as well as the applicable 
law to make that determination.10 Needless to say, Justice Scalia’s 
concerns in Ricoh seem not to have resurfaced in Atlantic Marine, unless 
those concerns were subsumed and accounted for by footnote 5. 
Part II then discusses the Court’s enduring fixation on litigation 
gamesmanship, with particular attention to the problem of forum 
shopping.11 The Court has consistently eschewed litigation 
gamesmanship and attempted to constrain all forms of creative forum 
shopping. Here this Article makes two points. First, the judiciary’s 
evolving jurisprudence has not only failed to prevent gamesmanship, but 
has instead fostered inventive procedural circumventions by practicing 
attorneys. No matter what the courts attempt to do to rein in 
gamesmanship—by statute, rule, or judicial opinion—attorneys still 
manage to invent new means to gain litigation advantage through 
 
a valid or invalid allocation of any inconvenience between the parties. If it is invalid, i.e., should be 
voided, between the parties, it cannot be entitled to any weight in the § 1404(a) determination.”). 
 8. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 582 (“[W]hen a party bound by a forum-selection clause flouts its 
contractual obligation and files suit in a different forum, a § 1404(a) transfer of venue will not carry 
with it the original venue’s choice-of-law rules—a factor that in some circumstances may affect public-
interest considerations.” (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981)). 
 9. 487 U.S. at 33–41 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (“[T]win aims of the Erie rule [are the] 
discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.”); Erie 
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73 n.6 (1938). 
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creative pre- and postlitigation practices. This is why we continue to have 
these cases. For the most part, courts have focused on postfiling 
procedural tactics, while paying less attention to prelitigation 
gamesmanship to achieve strategic advantage. Although courts have 
sought to avert egregious preemptive devices such as corporate 
reincorporation across state borders to achieve or defeat diversity 
jurisdiction, courts have not viewed forum-selection clauses through the 
lens of prelitigation gaming tactics. In the realm of consumer contracts, 
an appreciation of forum-selection and arbitration clauses as another 
form of sophisticated gamesmanship, presumably eschewed by the Court, 
ought to merit some attention and consideration. As will be discussed, this 
involves reframing the debate as a question of undesirable gamesmanship. 
Second, the Court’s forum-selection clause jurisprudence continues 
to perpetuate a muddled set of principles. It consistently fails to 
distinguish among parties to litigation, applying the same principles to 
cases involving uninformed consumers as to sophisticated business 
entities. In addition, if litigation arises in the Court’s admiralty jurisdiction, 
federal law applies to assess the validity and enforceability of a forum-
selection clause, but no such body of federal contract doctrine applies to 
forum-selection clause litigation in the Court’s diversity or federal 
question jurisdiction. As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent in Stewart, 
this anomaly gives rise to an array of strategic litigant behavior and 
gaming opportunities, which result in unsatisfactory and inconsistent 
outcomes depending on those choices.12 The gaming scenarios 
envisioned by Justice Scalia in his Stewart dissent have not been 
mitigated by Atlantic Marine. Instead, Atlantic Marine has further 
complicated this terrain by failing to answer these questions as well, or 
answering them with a variant set of rules for different situations. Finally, 
in the realm of arbitration clauses—analogized by the Court to forum-
selection clauses13—the Court has determined that the Federal Arbitration 
Act preempts application of state unconscionability jurisprudence, thus 
giving primacy to federal law and leaving scant room for consumers 
wishing to challenge such clauses.14 
Part III then focuses on the implications of Atlantic Marine for 
forum-selection clauses in consumer contracts, and by analogy to 
arbitration clauses. This discussion reiterates the theme of questions left 
unanswered by the Atlantic Marine decision, noting that the Atlantic 
Marine litigation involved a contractual agreement between sophisticated 
business entities. Thus, the Court had no reason to address enforceability 
problems in consumer contracts. Given the pervasive utilization of such 
 
 12. 487 U.S. at 40 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 13. Id. at 36 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974)). 
 14. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
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clauses, including arbitration clauses, by business entities in consumer 
transactions, the Court’s jurisprudence fails to provide adequate protection 
to consumers who are unwitting parties to unconscionable agreements. 
Atlantic Marine’s presupposition that such clauses are valid means that a 
consumer plaintiff will have her dispute transferred to the contractual 
forum preference, or adjudicated pursuant to alternative dispute 
resolution techniques apart from the court system. But if a consumer 
instead chooses to challenge the validity of a forum-selection clause, 
Atlantic Marine has left the parties in doctrinal limbo concerning what 
law, what forum, and the timing of such determination. 
This Article concludes by contending that the problems in this arena 
cannot effectively be resolved by rule revision or further doctrinal 
elaboration. Instead, the doctrinal uncertainties engendered by Atlantic 
Marine ought to be remedied by a federal statute setting forth substantive 
principles that apply to forum-selection (and choice-of-law) provisions in 
consumer contracts, but that do not confer any presumptive validity on 
such provisions. In essence, such statutory provisions should set forth a 
body of contract unconscionability principles that would apply in all 
cases within the federal court’s jurisdiction and, in the same fashion as 
the Federal Arbitration Act, preempt varying state law. 
I.  ATLANTIC MARINE: The Supreme Court’s Latest Voyage in 
Forum-Selection Clauses 
A. Answered Questions: What the Court Decided 
Whether one agrees with the outcome in Atlantic Marine or not, the 
Court’s decision did resolve one of those quirky problems that had 
inspired a vexing conflict among the lower federal courts concerning the 
interrelationship of contractual forum-selection clauses and attempts to 
implement forum selection according to those clauses.15 As Justice 
Roberts might characterize this decision, a unanimous Court in Atlantic 
Marine exercised its function of calling balls and strikes (in this instance, 
calling a series of three strikes against the plaintiff, and sending them 
back to the dugout for another at-bat in Texas).16 
The essential problem in Atlantic Marine addressed the issue of the 
appropriate procedural means to effectuate a contractual forum-selection 
clause, particularly in cases where a plaintiff sued a defendant in some 
locality other than the contractual forum. In such cases, defendants 
 
 15. See generally Sorensen, supra note 2 (comprehensively discussing and analyzing split among 
federal courts concerning appropriate procedural means for implementation of a forum-selection clause). 
 16. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the 
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) (statement of Judge 
John G. Roberts, Jr.) (“I will remember that it’s my job to call balls and strikes, and not to pitch or bat.”).   
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typically invoke and seek enforcement of the forum-selection clause in 
the plaintiff’s chosen forum, requesting to have the litigation relocated to 
the contractual forum or otherwise dismissed from the plaintiff’s choice 
of forum. 
The nub of the issue that percolated among federal courts centered 
on a disagreement concerning the proper procedural approach to enforcing 
a forum-selection clause. Litigants and courts resorted to a dazzling array 
of different procedural options to construe and implement a forum-
selection clause.17 First, some defendants invoked Federal Rule 
12(b)(3)18 and sought to have the case dismissed for a lack of proper 
venue.19 Second, some defendants invoked 28 U.S.C. § 140620 alleging 
improper venue, and sought to have the court relocate the case to the 
“proper” venue pursuant to the forum-selection clause.21 Third, other 
defendants instead relied on 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),22 arguing for a change 
of venue for the convenience of the parties and in the interests of 
justice.23 In more unusual scenarios, other defendants looked to Rule 
12(b)(6),24 Rule 12(c),25 and Rule 5626 to dismiss the case altogether on 
 
 17. See Maxwell J. Wright, Note, Enforcing Forum-Selection Clauses: An Examination of the 
Current Disarray of Federal Forum-Selection Clause Jurisprudence and a Proposal for Judicial 
Reform, 44 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1625, 1639–42 (2011) (collecting cases). 
 18. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) permits a defendant, before 
answering, to bring a motion to dismiss for “improper venue.” Neither the federal venue statute nor 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure define “wrong” or “improper” venue. See generally 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1391–1413 (2012). 
 19. See, e.g., Petersen v. Boeing Co., 715 F.3d 276, 279 (9th Cir. 2013) (reviewing district court’s 
decision to enforce a forum-selection clause under Rule 12(b)(3) for abuse of discretion); Union Elec. 
Co. v. Energy Ins. Mut. Ltd., 689 F.3d 968, 970–74 (8th Cir. 2012) (examining Rule 12(b)(3) and 
§ 1406(a) as procedural devices to give effect to forum clauses); Lim v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, 
Inc., 404 F.3d 898, 902 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding Rule 12(b)(3) and § 1406(a) are the procedural vehicles 
for dismissing or transferring an action that has been brought in an improper forum); Murphy v. 
Schneider Nat’l, Inc., 362 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing proper treatment of disputed facts 
relating to a forum-selection clause on a Rule 12(b)(3) motion, citing authorities). 
 20. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Section 1406(a) mandates dismissal or transfer of a “case laying venue in the 
wrong division or district.” The district court has discretion to choose between transfer and dismissal in 
evaluating motions pursuant to § 1406(a). 
 21. See Union Elec. Co., 689 F.3d at 970–74. 
 22. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (motion to transfer for the convenience of the parties and in the interest 
of justice). 
 23. See United States ex rel. J-Crew Mgmt., Inc. v. Atl. Marine Constr. Co., No. A-12-CV-228-LY, 
2012 WL 8499879, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2012) (relying on 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) as the appropriate 
procedural mechanism when invoking a forum-selection clause, but holding that Atlantic Marine 
failed to show that transfer pursuant to this provision would be in the interest of justice or increase the 
convenience of the witnesses and the parties); see also Williamson-Dickie Mfg. Co. v. M/V Heinrich J, 
762 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1028 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (surveying district court case law); Se. Consulting Grp., 
Inc. v. Maximus, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 2d 681, 683–84 (S.D. Miss. 2005) (same). 
 24. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted). See Silva v. Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 239 F.3d 385, 387 n.3 (1st Cir. 2001) (surveying “the 
variegated views among the circuits concerning the appropriate vehicle for a motion to dismiss based on a 
forum-selection clause”); Lawson Steel, Inc. v. All State Diversified Prods., Inc., No. 1:10-CV-1750, 
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dispositive grounds.27 Finally, yet other litigants invoked the federal 
common law doctrine of forum non conveniens to accomplish a dismissal 
from the plaintiff’s chosen forum.28 
The Supreme Court in Atlantic Marine seemingly cut through this 
procedural Gordian knot and set forth a simple set of negative and 
positive precepts relating to the enforcement of forum-selection clauses. 
Distilled to its essence, Atlantic Marine held the following: First, a party 
seeking to enforce a forum-selection clause cannot seek dismissal under 
28 U.S.C. § 1406 (a) or Rule 12(b)(3).29 Second, a forum-selection clause 
should be enforced through a motion to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1404(a).30 Third, a forum-selection clause that designates a state or a 
foreign forum can be enforced through application of the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens.31 Fourth, the Court declined to consider whether 
a defendant could use a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to enforce a forum-selection 
clause.32 
 
2010 WL 5147905, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 23, 2010) (citing Frietsch v. Refco, Inc., 56 F.3d 825, 830 (7th 
Cir. 1995)) (“The Circuit Courts of Appeal are split on the general question of whether a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion may be used to dismiss a case for improper venue based on a forum selection clause. Approval of 
Rule 12(b)(6) as a mechanism to dismiss a case for improper venue based on a forum selection clause has 
been deemed a minority view, however.” (citation omitted)). Two circuits held Rule 12(b)(6) as the 
appropriate mechanism for enforcing forum-selection clauses. See Silva, 239 F.3d at 387; Instrumentation 
Assocs., Inc. v. Madsen Elecs. (Can.) Ltd., 859 F.2d 4, 6 n.4 (3d Cir. 1988); see generally Brief of Professor 
Stephen E. Sachs as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. 
Court, 134 S. Ct. 568 (2013) (No. 12-929) (arguing defendant in a breach-of-contract action should be able 
to obtain dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) if the plaintiff files suit in a district other than the one specified in 
a valid forum-selection clause). 
 25. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) (motion for a judgment on the pleadings); see, e.g., NYMET Indus. 
Solutions, Inc. v. Maersk, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 2d 511, 516 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding forum-selection 
clause enforceable; granting defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(c)). 
 26. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (summary judgment as a matter of law); see Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. 
Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 588, 595 (1991) (enforcing a forum-selection clause via summary judgment); 
Rogen v. Memry Corp., 886 F. Supp. 393, 396–97 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“‘[S]ummary judgment is an 
appropriate vehicle to assess the enforceability of a forum selection clause.’” (quoting Grissom v. 
Colotti, 644 F. Supp. 903, 904 (D.P.R. 1986))). 
 27. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 28. See Aguas Lenders Recovery Grp. v. Suez, S.A., 585 F.3d 696, 700 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Gulf 
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947)) (holding where parties contract to a permissive forum-
selection clause “that designates a forum in advance, but does not preclude a different choice, the M/S 
Bremen presumption of enforceability does not apply; instead, in such cases, the traditional forum non 
conveniens standards apply”); Kanza Constr., Inc. v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., No. 13-CV-0489-W-
DGK, 2014 WL 1356676 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 7, 2014) (holding subcontractor’s motion to dismiss on forum 
non conveniens grounds, based on mandatory forum-selection clause, was warranted). 
 29. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 577–79. 
 30. Id. at 579–80. 
 31. Id. at 580. 
 32. Id. The Court declined to evaluate the Rule 12(b)(6) procedural option on the grounds that the 
defendant had not sought to enforce the forum-selection clause through this provision, and that the issue 
had not been briefed to the Court. However, the Court further indicated that even if a defendant could 
use Rule 12(b)(6) to enforce a forum-selection clause, it would not change the conclusion that § 1406(a) 
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Elaborating on its fundamental conclusion that forum-selection 
clauses should be enforced through a motion to transfer under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1404(a), the Court further opined that “when the parties have agreed 
to a valid forum-selection clause, a district court should ordinarily 
transfer the case to the forum specified in that clause.”33 The presence of 
a valid forum-selection clause should be given controlling weight in all 
but the most exceptional circumstances.34 Conversely, courts should deny 
a motion to transfer only under extraordinary circumstances that are 
unrelated to the convenience of the parties.35 
In addition, the Court announced that courts now needed to modify 
the “calculus” governing § 1404(a) transfers in three additional ways.36 
First, the plaintiff’s choice of forum merited no weight.37 Instead, the 
plaintiff resisting transfer to the contractual forum henceforth carried the 
burden of establishing that the transfer was unwarranted.38 Second, in 
evaluating a defendant’s § 1404(a) transfer motion, courts should not 
consider arguments about the parties’ private interests, an inquiry that 
typically informs a traditional transfer motion.39 Third, on a § 1404(a) 
transfer based on a forum-selection clause, the case would not carry with 
it the original venue’s (the transferee court’s) choice-of-law rules.40 In so 
ruling, the Court carved out an exception—for forum-selection clause 
cases only—to the principles from Van Dusen v. Barrack and Ferens v. 
John Deere Co. that govern the applicable law on transfer motions.41 
 
and Rule 12(b)(3) were not the proper mechanisms to enforce a forum-selection clause. The ruling on the 
Rule 12(b)(6) argument was effectively the third strike, or at least, called as a foul ball. 
 33. Id. at 581. 
 34. Id. The Court did not define what such exceptional circumstances might be. 
 35. Id. The Court did not suggest what such extraordinary circumstances might be, noting that no 
exceptional circumstances were presented by the underlying facts in the case. 
 36. Id. at 581–84. 
 37. Id. at 581. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 582 (“When parties agree to a forum-selection clause, they waive the right to challenge 
the preselected forum as inconvenient or less convenient for themselves or their witnesses, or for their 
pursuit of the litigation. A court accordingly must deem the private-interest factors to weigh entirely in 
favor of the preselected forum.”). 
 40. Id. at 582–83. 
 41. See generally Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990) (holding transferee court applies 
law of transferor court on plaintiff’s motion for transfer); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964) 
(holding transferee court applies law of transferor court on defendant’s motion for transfer). 
Mullenix-66.3.doc (Do Not Delete) 3/23/2015 5:08 PM 
728 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:719 
B. Unanswered Questions: What the Court Did Not Decide, or, 
Confounding Choice-of-Law Implications 
1. Mitigating the Harshness of Atlantic Marine: All Those 
Qualifiers 
The purpose of this Article is not to evaluate the legitimacy of the 
Court’s reasoning in Atlantic Marine or its conclusions concerning the 
appropriate procedural mechanism for enforcing a forum-selection clause. 
Rather, taking as given the Court’s core ruling that § 1404(a) provides 
the proper vehicle for a defendant’s invocation of a forum-selection clause, 
this Article instead focuses on the opaque and somewhat discouraging 
doctrine for consumers engendered by the Court’s opinion, as well as 
crucial issues the Court failed to address. 
In the realm of doctrinal murkiness, it is unclear whether, post-
Atlantic Marine, forum-selection clauses are presumptively valid unless 
somehow and somewhere proven otherwise. In various portions of the 
opinion, the Court seemed to nudge its pronouncements in the direction 
favoring such presumptive validity.42 
Nonetheless, the Court’s opinion is littered with qualifying language 
and rhetoric that presumably leaves open several avenues by which a 
dissenting party might challenge a forum-selection clause in the future. 
Whether these fissures in the Court’s decision will provide meaningful 
opportunities to contest the possible transfer or dismissal of a case 
pursuant to a forum-selection clause remains unclear, but this seems 
highly unlikely given the overall tone of the Court’s pronouncements. 
Thus, judges in forthcoming decisions will have the unhappy task of 
providing some content to Atlantic Marine’s qualifying language. 
For example, in contemplating situations where parties have agreed 
to a contractual forum-selection clause, the Court has inverted (actually, 
completely abandoned) the usual federal court deference to a plaintiff’s 
choice of forum. Instead, the Court announced that henceforth a 
plaintiff’s choice of forum merits no weight.43 Thus, a plaintiff who 
attempts to resist a forum-selection clause has the burden to establish 
that a transfer to the forum for which the parties bargained is 
unwarranted.44 This weasel word in the Court’s opinion provides scant 
content to the plaintiff’s evidentiary burden of establishing what 
constitutes a warranted or an unwarranted transfer. 
As indicated above, the Court in Atlantic Marine substantially 
modified the test for a § 1404 transfer of venue, stripping that inquiry of 
consideration of private interest factors that undergird traditional forum 
 
 42. See infra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. 
 43. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581. 
 44. Id. 
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non conveniens analysis.45 The Court twice noted in its opinion that 
when a defendant files a § 1404(a) transfer motion, a district court should 
transfer the case unless extraordinary circumstances unrelated to the 
convenience of the parties clearly disfavor a transfer.46 The Court concluded 
that no such exceptional factors were present in the case, leaving one to 
wonder what the district court has left to do on remand.47 Further, the 
Court opined that since public interest factors rarely defeat a transfer 
motion,48 “the practical result is that forum-selection clauses should 
control except in unusual cases.”49 One assumes that on remand the 
federal district court for the Western District of Texas is supposed to 
heed the Supreme Court’s overtones. 
What the Court has not told us in Atlantic Marine is what remaining 
extraordinary or exceptional public interest factors will defeat a motion 
to transfer or dismiss a case pursuant to a forum-selection clause. In 
addition, the Court has not told us what unusual cases will overcome a 
defendant’s motion to transfer or dismiss. 
Justice Alito, citing Justice Kenney’s concurring opinion in Stewart, 
reiterated that proper application of § 1404(a) requires that a forum-
selection clause be “given controlling weight in all but the most 
exceptional cases.”50 But the Atlantic Marine decision fails to indicate 
what types of cases (or circumstances) qualify as exceptional so as to 
provide less heft to consideration of a forum-selection clause. In the 
relatively few post-Stewart instances where a plaintiff invoked Justice 
Kennedy’s “exceptional case” qualification, courts have concluded that 
plaintiffs had not met the burden of showing that the case provided the 
exceptional circumstances in which the clause should not be enforced 
 
 45. See id. at 582. 
 46. Id. at 575, 581 (“Only under extraordinary circumstances unrelated to the convenience of the 
parties should a § 1404(a) motion be denied.”). 
 47. Id. at 581, 584 (“Although no public-interest factors that might support the denial of Atlantic 
Marine’s motion to transfer are apparent on the record before us, we remand the case for the courts 
below to decide that question.”). 
 48. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947) (defining public interest factors as 
embracing administrative difficulties such as docket congestion; burden of jury duty imposed on 
citizens in a location with no relationship to the litigation (that is, the competing interests of forums); 
and difficulties presented by application of choice-of-law questions); see also Piper Aircraft Co. v. 
Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 260–61 (1981) (Gulf Oil public interest factors favored litigation in Scotland). See 
generally Michael M. Karayanni, The Myth and Reality of a Controversy: “Public Factors” and the 
Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine, 21 Wis. Int’l L.J. 327, 330, 335–63 (2003) (arguing that the 
distinction between private and public law factors in Gulf Oil is incoherent); 14D Charles Alan 
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3828.4 (4th ed. 2013) (citing forum non 
conveniens cases illustrating the balancing of private and public interests). 
 49. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 582 (emphasis added). 
 50. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 579 (emphasis added) (citing Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 
U.S. 22, 33 (1988) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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because it was unreasonable.51 Thus, Justice Kennedy’s “exceptional cases” 
qualification, rotely recited in Atlantic Marine, is likely to remain a 
toothless tiger for parties opposing application of a forum-selection 
clause. 
As indicated above, the Atlantic Marine decision was predicated on 
the presupposed validity of the forum-selection clause in that case. But 
other assumptions pervade the Court’s decision. In declaring that judges 
should no longer consider private interest factors relating to party 
convenience on a § 1404(a) transfer motion, the Court concluded that 
this was justified because any inconvenience resulting from being forced 
to litigate in a contractual forum “‘was clearly foreseeable at the time of 
contracting.’”52 
That conclusory pronouncement begs the question whether this is 
indeed factually true in any particular case. Thus, the problem of a 
reasonable foreseeability of inconvenience to the parties has substantial 
relevance to cases involving consumer contracts, where it is highly 
unlikely that the “contracting” consumer either has knowledge of the 
forum-selection clause or has reasonably calculated and waived the 
consumer’s relative inconvenience if she subsequently seeks remediation. 
Summing up, what we have here is a bleak house, at least for 
consumers ensnared unknowingly and unwittingly by forum-selection 
clauses inserted into ordinary consumer contracts. On the one hand, the 
Court decorated the Atlantic Marine decision with lots of ornamental 
modifiers intended, one supposes, to soften the impact of its actual harsh 
consequences. Thus, we have the language of unwarranted, unusual, 
exceptional, most exceptional, extraordinary, and unforeseeable. On the 
other hand, the Court seems to be wishing litigants good luck with all 
that. To make a prospective challenger’s life even more difficult, the 
Court has now declared that if one gets to the point of evaluating a 
transfer analysis, only public interest factors count. Only if a litigant can 
somehow demonstrate any or all of the qualifying adjectives may she 
avoid the effect of a forum-selection clause. 
 
 51. See Fluidtech, Inc. v. Gemu Valves, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 2d 762, 766–67 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (finding 
no exceptional circumstances to render forum-selection clause unenforceable); Freedman v. Am. Online, 
Inc., 294 F. Supp. 2d 238, 243 (D. Conn. 2003) (same); Stewart v. Dean-Michaels Corp., 716 F. Supp. 1400, 
1401–02 (N.D. Ala. 1989) (“Plaintiffs here strive to convince this court that they come within some 
exception recognized by the Eleventh Circuit in In re Ricoh Corporation. Not having been told by the 
Eleventh Circuit what, if any, exceptional circumstances would justify choosing a forum other than the 
forum provided in a forum selection clause, this court is unconvinced that either set of plaintiffs comes 
within any exception.” (citation omitted)). It is difficult to locate any case in which a court has concluded 
the opposite: those exceptional circumstances compel nonenforcement of a forum-selection clause. 
 52. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 582 (emphasis added) (“As we have explained in a different but 
‘instructive’ context, ‘[w]hatever “inconvenience” [the parties] would suffer by being forced to litigate 
in the contractual forum as [they] agreed to do was clearly foreseeable at the time of contracting.’” (quoting 
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1972) (citing Stewart, 487 U.S. at 33)). 
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2. The Still Unresolved Chicken-and-Egg Problem 
The core problem with the Atlantic Marine decision has less to do 
with a collection of grey rhetorical minutiae than with the Court’s basic 
premise. In its final analysis, the entire Atlantic Marine edifice is erected 
on the foundational concept that the forum-selection clause in that case 
was valid.53 In footnote 5 the Court simply noted that “[its] analysis 
presuppose[d] a contractually valid forum-selection clause.”54 Thus, the 
Atlantic Marine decision proceeds from that presupposition of validity,55 
notwithstanding all the surrounding language qualifying that presupposition 
in other cases. 
Obviously, the Court’s analysis begs the question of what conclusions 
might follow if a forum-selection clause is not valid, or not presumptively 
valid. In turn, this foundational premise inspires a confounding host of 
chicken-and-egg-like issues relating to a threshold determination of the 
validity and enforceability of forum-selection clauses. The Court opened 
the door to these inquiries by virtue of footnote 5. If we cannot rely on a 
presupposition that a forum-selection clause is valid, then, at a minimum, 
at least three legitimate questions arise: (1) What body of law applies to 
evaluate the validity and enforceability of a forum-selection clause? 
(2) What court should make that determination? (3) When should that 
determination be made? Furthermore, how might the answers to these 
possible questions intersect with the Court’s other conclusions in 
Atlantic Marine? 
These inquiries are further complicated if the contract also contains 
a choice-of-law provision,56 in addition to or even in the absence of a 
forum-selection clause.57 The Court in Atlantic Marine did not have to 
address this additional doctrinal wrinkle because there seems not to have 
been a parallel choice-of-law provision in the underlying contract.58 
However, in cases where a contract includes an applicable law 
provision, myriad problems emerge. Thus, a choice-of-law provision 
might point to the application of law other than the law of the plaintiff’s 
chosen forum. In such cases, as a matter of first instance, does the 
plaintiff’s chosen forum apply its own law to determine the validity and 
 
 53. Id. at 581 & n.5. 
 54. Id. at 581 n.5. 
 55. Id. at 581. 
 56. See generally Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (enforcing Florida federal 
forum based on presence of choice-of-law provision in Burger King franchise agreement selecting 
Florida law as applicable to disputes arising out of the contract despite the fact that the contract did 
not include a forum-selection clause). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See United States ex rel. J-Crew Mgmt., Inc. v. Atl. Marine Constr. Co., No. A-12-CV-228-
LY, 2012 WL 8499879, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2012) (discussing forum-selection clause designating 
Circuit Court of Norfolk, Virginia or U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk 
Division, as chosen jurisdiction and venue). 
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enforceability of the clauses, or does the choice-of-law provision compel 
interpretation of validity and enforceability based on the contractual 
forum’s law? Does the answer to this question vary depending on 
whether the court’s authority is based on admiralty, federal question, or 
diversity jurisdiction? And, if the threshold dispute centers on the 
validity and enforceability of choice-of-law and forum-selection clauses, 
why should another forum’s law (other than the plaintiff’s chosen 
forum), govern these questions? 
3. Of Suppositions: No Court Determined the Validity or 
Enforceability of the Atlantic Marine Forum-Selection Clause 
These threshold problems of what court determines the validity and 
enforceability of a forum-selection clause according to what applicable 
law are not easily addressed and answered. The Atlantic Marine 
litigation provides an interesting illustration of precisely these problems. 
For example, the contractual agreement underlying the original Atlantic 
Marine litigation seems not to have included a choice-of-law provision, 
but only a forum-selection clause.59 The dispute between Atlantic Marine 
and its subcontractor J-Crew arose out of a land-based construction 
dispute (to distinguish this from the sea-based admiralty cases) that was filed 
in federal court based on diversity.60 Consequently, it would appear that 
under the Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins/Klaxon Co. v. Stentor doctrine,61 
the court ought to have looked to Texas law to have determined the 
validity and enforceability of the clause. 
And, indeed, J-Crew argued precisely that: it challenged the 
enforceability of the forum-selection clause based on the Texas Business 
and Commerce Code, which effectively voids such provisions in 
construction contract disputes.62 Nonetheless, the district court ruled that 
Texas state law did not apply. This is because the construction project 
giving rise to the payment dispute was in Fort Hood, Texas, a federal 
enclave, and that Texas had ceded exclusive jurisdiction of Fort Hood to 
the United States in 1950. Hence, federal law applied to the question of 
whether Texas law voided the clause, which the district court held it did 
not.63 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at *5. 
 61. See generally Klaxon Co. v. Stentor, 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (holding states’ choice-of-law 
regimes are substantive for Erie purposes; courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply forum state 
choice-of-law principles to determine application law); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) 
(holding federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction apply state substantive law but federal 
procedural rules). 
 62.  See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 272.001 (West 2014) (“Voidable Contract Provision”);  
J-Crew Mgmt., 2012 WL 8499879, at *2. 
 63. Id. at *2–3. 
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That is as far as the court’s analysis went. Significantly, the district 
court never determined whether the forum-selection clause, as a primary 
matter, was valid and enforceable; instead the court pivoted exclusively 
to lengthy digression of the appropriate procedural means for 
effectuating the clause.64 This focus, in turn, dictated that the appellate 
court’s review of the district court’s rulings similarly concentrated 
exclusively on that question.65 Hence, the Supreme Court’s supposition 
that the contested forum-selection clause in Atlantic Marine was valid 
was precisely that: a supposition. The lower courts had never determined 
the validity of the clause at any point in the proceedings, and certainly 
had not addressed what law should apply to make that determination. 
Nor did the appellate court consider these questions on review. 
Theoretically, then, the validity of the forum-selection clause in Atlantic 
Marine is still an open question, as well as what law applies to make that 
determination. 
4. Justice Scalia on Threshold Determinations of Validity and 
Enforceability of Forum-Selection Clauses 
One might note that Justice Scalia, dissenting in Stewart, recognized 
this set of problems.66 In Stewart, the majority held that when a 
defendant invokes a forum-selection clause, § 1404(a) governs the issue 
of whether to give effect to the parties’ forum-selection clause and 
transfer the case to the designated forum.67 But the majority further held 
that in conducting an analysis under § 1404(a) and evaluating the relative 
private and public interests that inform a § 1404(a) request, courts must 
assess countervailing arguments under federal and state law to determine 
what weight to give to a forum-selection clause.68 With this pronouncement, 
the Stewart majority in essence fashioned a federal common law 
jurisprudence governing forum-selection clauses in diversity cases. 
Justice Scalia began his dissent by agreeing with the Court’s 
conclusion that the question of the validity of a forum-selection clause 
falls within the analysis of a § 1404(a) transfer.69 But he disagreed that 
federal courts could fashion a judge-made rule to govern this issue of 
contract validity.70 Scalia opined, “Since no federal statute or [r]ule of 
 
 64. Id. at *4–9. 
 65. See generally In re Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 701 F.3d 736 (5th Cir. 2012) (deciding without 
considering the threshold question of validity and enforceability of the forum-selection clause). 
 66. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 33–41 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 67. Id. at 32 (majority opinion). 
 68. Id. at 30. 
 69. See id. at 33 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 70. Id.; see also id. at 37 (“Section 1404(a) is simply a venue provision that nowhere mentions 
contracts or agreements, much less that the validity of certain contracts or agreements will be matters 
of federal law. It is difficult to believe that state contract law was meant to be pre-empted by this 
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[p]rocedure governs the validity of a forum-selection clause, the 
remaining issue is whether federal courts may fashion a judge-made rule 
to govern the question. If they may not, the Rules of Decision Act, 
28 U.S.C. § 1652, mandates use of state law.”71 
Scalia further suggested that the majority’s opinion begged the 
question of what law governs whether a forum-selection clause is a valid 
or invalid allocation of any inconvenience between the parties. After a 
lengthy Erie analysis, Scalia ultimately concluded that Erie and its 
progeny mandated that state law controls the question of the validity of a 
forum-selection clause.72 
Thus, if a forum-selection clause was invalid and should be voided, it 
is not, in Scalia’s view, entitled to any weight in the § 1404 determination.73 
Moreover, Scalia protested that it was inappropriate for the determination 
of a forum-selection clause’s validity to be “wrenched” from state contract 
principles.74 He suggested that Congress, in enacting the Federal 
Arbitration Act’s preemption provision, demonstrated that it knew how 
to preempt state contract law, and “in precisely the same field of 
agreement regarding forum selection.”75 
Significantly, in eschewing the majority’s fashioning of a federal 
common law to govern § 1404(a) transfers in forum-selection clause 
cases, Scalia expressed concern that the Court’s interpretation of § 1404(a) 
would lead to significant and inevitable encouragement of forum 
shopping.76 In the underlying case, the Eleventh Circuit had held, as a 
matter of federal law, that the parties’ forum-selection clause was valid 
and required the transfer of the case to New York City, even though 
Alabama state law, where the plaintiff filed suit, did not recognize the 
validity or enforceability of forum-selection clauses.77 Justice Scalia 
concluded that the Eleventh Circuit’s rule “clearly encourages forum 
 
provision that we have said ‘should be regarded as a federal judicial housekeeping measure.’” (quoting 
Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 636 (1964))). 
 71. Id. at 38 (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72–73 (1938)). 
 72. Id. at 38–39. Accord Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 221 (2d Cir. 2014) (eschewing 
creation and application of a federal common law governing the interpretation of forum-selection 
clauses; arguing that contract law is quintessentially substantive for Erie purposes and therefore in the 
realm of the states). 
 73. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 74. Id. at 36 (“[Section] 1404(a) was enacted against the background that issues of contract, 
including a contract’s validity, are nearly always governed by state law. It is simply contrary to the 
practice of our system that such an issue should be wrenched from state control in absence of a clear 
conflict with federal law or explicit statutory provision.”). 
 75. Id.; see Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (preempting state contract law). See 
generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (holding Federal Arbitration Act 
preempts California state law on contract unconscionability principles governing contractual 
arbitration clauses). 
 76. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 38 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 77. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh, 810 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1987). 
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shopping,”78 and described at least two scenarios where, as a 
consequence of the majority’s holdings, litigants would attempt to game 
the system: 
Venue is often a vitally important matter, as is shown by the frequency 
with which parties contractually provide for and litigate the issue. Suit 
might well not be pursued, or might not be as successful, in a significantly 
less convenient forum. Transfer to such a less desirable forum is, 
therefore, of sufficient import that plaintiffs will base their decisions on 
the likelihood of that eventuality when they are choosing whether to 
sue in state or federal court. With respect to forum-selection clauses, in 
a State with law unfavorable to validity, plaintiffs who seek to avoid 
the effect of a clause will be encouraged to sue in state court, and 
nonresident defendants will be encouraged to shop for more favorable 
law by removing to federal court. In the reverse situation—where a 
State has law favorable to enforcing such clauses—plaintiffs will be 
encouraged to sue in federal court. This significant encouragement to 
forum shopping is alone sufficient to warrant application of state law.79 
The Court’s decision in Atlantic Marine was unanimous, so whatever 
concerns or reservations Justice Scalia expressed in his Stewart dissent 
were not urged again or reflected in Atlantic Marine. Certainly the Court’s 
conclusion in Atlantic Marine that § 1404(a) is the procedural 
mechanism for effectuating forum-selection clauses is consistent with its 
prior holding in Stewart, and Justice Scalia joined with the Stewart 
majority in that holding. 
Nonetheless, Justice Scalia’s silence in Atlantic Marine concerning 
what law applies to determine the validity of a forum-selection clause is 
somewhat baffling because of the fuss he made over this question in his 
Stewart dissent, emerging as a champion of state law. Several theories 
suggest themselves. It could be that the Court’s presupposition in Atlantic 
Marine of the validity of the forum-selection clause averted any further 
discussion of what law applies to determine a clause’s validity and 
therefore Justice Scalia concluded that this issue—not raised—merited 
no further discussion. It could be that Justice Alito’s analysis of § 1404(a) 
convinced Justice Scalia that federal law simply applies to preempt any 
state law conflict. It could be that Justice Alito’s excise of private law 
factors from a § 1404(a) analysis—that is, no weighing of relative 
inconvenience to the parties—foreclosed discussion of underlying factual 
questions relating to state contract formation principles and 
unconscionability doctrine. Maybe Justice Scalia simply forgot his prior 
dissenting position in Stewart. Who knows? 
At any rate, the Court’s Atlantic Marine decision arguably advances 
a more robust version of its Stewart holdings. Thus, the Court 
determined, consistent with Stewart, that § 1404(a) applies as the 
 
 78. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 39 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 79. Id. at 39–40 (citations omitted). 
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procedural vehicle for implementing a forum-selection clause on a 
transfer motion. In addition, the Court federalized the law concerning 
validity of a forum-selection clause within the context of a § 1404(a) 
transfer motion, pursuant to a new set of highly constricted principles 
that left no room for the application of possibly conflicting state law 
doctrine on contract unconscionability. 
II.  The Judicial System’s Longstanding Preoccupation with and 
Antipathy Toward Gaming the System 
A. Creative Manipulation of Federal Jurisdiction, Venue, and 
Other Interesting Gambits 
Assume for the purpose of discussion that Justice Scalia in his 
Stewart dissent was correct with regard to forum-selection clauses, the 
Court’s federalization of forum-selection clause validity, and the consequent 
effects of all this on forum shopping. If Justice Scalia was correct about 
the forum-shopping problem engendered by forum-selection clauses, 
then, at best, nothing has changed much by virtue of the Atlantic Marine 
decision. 
To generalize, post-Atlantic Marine, it makes sense for plaintiffs 
who might be subject to a forum-selection clause in some unfavorable 
location to sue in a state court that disallows (or looks unfavorably upon) 
enforcement of forum-selection clauses—say in an Alabama or 
California state court. Likewise, it makes sense for a defendant in such 
situations to remove to federal court and then seek transfer pursuant to 
§ 1404(a), invoking the forum-selection clause and basically getting a free 
pass to the contractual forum under the new Atlantic Marine forum-
selection clause transfer principles. 
However, where state law favors enforcement of forum-selection 
clauses, plaintiffs are now essentially out of luck. Plaintiffs will have little 
incentive to file in either state or federal court, because it will be well-
nigh impossible to successfully challenge the enforcement of a forum-
selection clause in either a state or federal forum. 
Either way, the problem with these forum-shopping possibilities is 
that forum-selection clauses will almost always provide defendants with a 
“heads I win, tails you lose” forum preference. Forum-selection clauses, 
then, rather unfairly stack the deck in defendants’ favor because, either 
as a matter of original or removal jurisdiction, defendants will wind up in 
federal court with the ability to enforce the forum-selection clause to 
transfer a case to the forum of the defendant’s choosing. It may be 
protested that this is not unfair given the parties’ contractual agreement, 
but in consumer cases, knowing and willing agreement to the contract 
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typically is not the case.80 Moreover, against this backdrop, forum-
selection clause jurisprudence does an inadequate job—actually a fairly 
poor job—of distinguishing among types of forum-selection clause 
cases.81 
The Court’s forum-selection clause doctrine is built on the foundation 
of contract law rather than jurisdictional jurisprudence,82 and the Court’s 
four forum-selection clause opinions are suffused with rhetoric surrounding 
the sanctity of contract law.83 Lower federal courts in lockstep have 
endorsed the sanctity-of-contract approach to forum-selection clauses.84 
Because of the enormous strategic advantage conferred by contractual 
forum-selection clauses on defendants and the fundamental unfairness of 
the law to consumers governing such provisions, it is thought provoking 
to view forum-selection clauses, then, as a strategic mechanism to game 
the system rather than through the lens of sanctified contract principles. 
From this gamesmanship perspective, courts might have a different 
reception to forum-selection clauses and their consequent effects on the 
justness and fairness of the legal system. 
1. A Brief Historical Survey of Gamesmanship in Federal and 
State Court 
In this regard, federal courts have long been preoccupied with 
resisting or restraining litigants’ attempts to game the system. In the 
twentieth century, the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
as well as various statutory jurisdictional provisions, has served to 
enhance creative means for manipulating strategic advantage in a dual 
 
 80. See, e.g., Rud v. Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Boston, 438 F.3d 772, 776 (7th Cir. 2006) (“When 
the Supreme Court in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute held enforceable a forum-selection clause 
printed on the back of a cruise ticket, it brushed aside the arguments that many consumers don’t read 
the fine print in their contracts and do not appreciate the significance, or perhaps even the meaning, of 
a forum-selection clause.” (citation omitted)). 
 81. See, e.g., Silva v. Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 239 F.3d 385, 389 (1st Cir. 2001) (rejecting 
argument challenging boilerplate forum-selection clause printed on back of employment contract). 
 82. See, e.g., Charles L. Knapp, Contract Law Walks the Plank: Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. 
Shute, 12 Nev. L.J. 553 (2012); Linda S. Mullenix, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute: The Titanic of 
Worst Decisions, 12 Nev. L.J. 549 (2012) [hereinafter Mullenix, The Titanic of Worst Decisions]; 
Linda S. Mullenix, Another Easy Case, Some More Bad Law: Carnival Cruise Lines and Contractual 
Personal Jurisdiction, 27 Tex. Int’l L.J. 323 (1992) [hereinafter, Mullenix, Another Easy Case]; Linda 
S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure 
in Federal Court, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 291 (1988). 
 83. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 84. See, e.g., Braspero Oil Servs. Co. v. Modec (USA), Inc., 240 F. App’x 612, 615 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(endorsing principle that forum-selection clauses are presumptively valid and enforceable because 
they eliminate uncertainty as to forum for the resolution of disputes); IFC Credit Corp. v. Aliano Bros. 
Gen. Contractors, Inc., 437 F.3d 606, 610 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[The Supreme Court’s] approach is to treat a 
forum-selection clause basically like any other contractual provision and hence to enforce it unless it is 
subject to any of the sorts of infirmity, such as fraud or mistake, that justify a court’s refusing to 
enforce a contract. Freedom of contract requires no less.”). 
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court system. Not that there is anything wrong with this: this is what 
attorneys zealously representing their clients are expected to do.85 Yet 
federal courts have drawn distinctions between legitimate lawyering 
efforts and litigation gambits that cross an impermissible line to 
unacceptable gamesmanship.86 
One does not have to research very extensively to discover the 
courts’ historical antipathy to questionable litigation gamesmanship, 
including dubious tactics that attorneys attempt in both pre- and postfiling 
efforts. Much of this preoccupation with strategic gamesmanship has 
focused on techniques to secure forum advantage.87 Congress and the 
judiciary, in reaction to these creative lawyering ventures, have responded 
with various ameliorative amended rules, statutory provisions, and sanctions 
intended to fix perceived problems and to level the litigation playing field 
between plaintiffs and defendants. 
Beginning with the Erie decision itself,88 numerous examples 
illustrate the judicial aversion to litigation gamesmanship. The Erie 
Court, in addressing the problem of forum shopping to obtain the 
advantage of more favorable federal common law, noted the forum-
shopping problem engendered by the classic Black & White Taxicab & 
Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co. case,89 where 
the Brown & Yellow taxicab company, ostensibly a Kentucky corporation, 
simply reincorporated over the border in Tennessee and executed its 
contract there in order to gain the advantage of favorable Tennessee 
contract law.90 The Erie decision thus represents a doctrinal solution 
intended to frustrate the Black & White Taxicab prelitigation behavior 
 
 85. See generally Richard Maloy, Forum Shopping? What’s Wrong With That?, 24 Quinnipiac L. 
Rev. 25 (2005) (defining and defending forum-shopping techniques); Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 
103 Harv. L. Rev. 1677 (1990) (describing forum-shopping activities on a continuum; arguing that 
some forum-shopping activities may enhance remediation opportunities). 
 86. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 87. Gamesmanship may take many forms during the litigation process:  
Gamesmanship is also said to occur when lawyers forum shop, refuse to examine their own 
witnesses in depositions to prevent opponents from gleaning information, file excessive or 
unnecessary motions, institute lawsuits involving identical issues simultaneously in state and 
federal courts, fail to obey court orders, employ tactical delays, file frivolous pleadings and 
engage in “recreational” litigation, enter into settlement agreements in bad faith to strip 
federal courts of exclusive jurisdiction, and exercise the removal jurisdiction of the federal 
courts in some cases. Significantly, courts acknowledge that undue gamesmanship often 
occurs within the rules of procedure. Arguably, much of the gamesmanship appears to 
involve not the violation of, but rather the strategic use of, court rules. 
Craig Enoch, Incivility in the Legal System? Maybe It’s the Rules, 47 SMU L. Rev. 199, 207–08 (1994). 
 88. See generally 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 89. Id. at 73 (citing Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer 
Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928)). 
 90. Id. 
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that patently was intended to manipulate forum selection and applicable 
law. 
Over the years, attorneys have continued to resort to all sorts of 
creative means for manipulating jurisdiction. As incredible as this 
sounds, prospective decedents (aided by their attorneys) accomplished 
one of the more interesting subchapters in forum manipulation.91 This 
curious subgroup of folks (1) anticipated their own death, (2) foresaw a 
dispute over their estate, (3) understood the difference between state and 
federal law, (4) desired to have any such claims litigated in federal court 
rather than state court, and (5) therefore contractually designated an 
out-of-state representative as the executor of the estate in order to secure 
federal diversity jurisdiction.92 By the mid-1970s and ’80s there were 
enough of these odd cases that the federal courts balked and Congress 
stepped in to effectively resolve this type of forum manipulation by 
amending the federal diversity statute.93 
Statutory law,94 bolstered by judicial rulings, has repudiated litigant 
efforts to secure federal jurisdiction by collusive joinder through sham 
contractual assignment of rights.95 Congress and the courts, through 
statutory provisions as well as decisional law, have also repudiated efforts 
to defeat removal jurisdiction by plaintiffs’ improper or fraudulent joinder 
of nondiverse defendants.96 The principle relating to fraudulent joinder 
extends to the post-removal tactic of subsequently joining nondiverse 
defendants to defeat removal and support a remand motion.97 
The judicial system has further manifested its distaste for 
jurisdictional gamesmanship through the doctrine of artful pleading. The 
artful pleading doctrine is intended to curb creative complaint design, 
whereby plaintiffs inventively massage claims or damages with the 
 
 91. See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Creative Manipulation of Federal Jurisdiction: Is There 
Diversity After Death?, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 1011 (1985) (discussing this form of forum manipulation; 
citing cases). 
 92. With regard to this strange line of cases, one can only wonder why a decedent would care 
about applicable law after her own death. 
 93. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2) (2012) (stating that an estate’s administrator or executor has the 
same citizenship as the decedent). 
 94. See id. § 1659 (collusive joinder of parties); Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc., 394 U.S. 823 
(1969) (finding collusive joinder of party through sham contract agreement violated statutory prohibition 
against such collusive joinder). 
 95. Kramer, 394 U.S. at 824. 
 96. See generally 13 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3641.1 
(3d ed. 1998) (“Devices to Defeat Diversity Jurisdiction—Joinder of Nondiverse Parties.”). 
 97. See, e.g., Ibis Villas at Miami Gardens Condo Ass’n, Inc. v. Aspen Specialty Ins. Co., 799 F. 
Supp. 2d 1333, 1335 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (holding courts should be highly suspicious of joinder of 
nondiverse party after removal but before discovery, for intended purpose to defeat diversity 
jurisdiction); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) (“If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional 
defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or 
permit joinder and remand the action to State court . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
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intention to circumvent or defeat removal to federal court.98 Indeed, 
courts and commentators have noted that congressional enactment of the 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”) was intended, in significant 
part, to deal with plaintiffs’ gamesmanship in pursuing class action 
litigation in more favorable state forums and pleading around potential 
federal removal jurisdiction.99 Congress also intended, in CAFA, to 
address a form of jurisdictional gamesmanship whereby plaintiffs’ 
attorneys filed copycat class actions, alleging the same injuries on behalf 
of the same classes of plaintiffs, in multiple state courts.100 
The so-called “forum defendant rule” has likewise unleashed what 
one federal court has deemed “the latest litigation fad” in forum-
shopping gamesmanship.101 The forum defendant rule provides that a 
case is removable “only if none of the parties in interest properly joined 
and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which the action is 
brought.”102 The particular removal language “properly joined and 
served” has turned into a fruitful avenue for removal gamesmanship, 
allowing defendants to seek speedy removal before any defendant is 
served in state court. At least one federal court has noted, 
disapprovingly, that while congressional intent in enacting the forum 
defendant rule was to circumvent gamesmanship by plaintiffs,103 that 
statutory language is now being deployed by defendants to game the 
system: 
The tactics employed by defendants such as in the instant case turn 
Congressional intent on its head by allowing defendants to employ 
gamesmanship, specifically by rushing to remove a newly filed state 
court case before the plaintiff can perfect service on anyone. Given 
that Congress intended the “properly joined and served” language to 
prevent litigant gamesmanship, “it would be especially absurd to 
interpret the same ‘joined and served’ requirement to actually condone 
 
 98. See, e.g., Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 475–76 (2009) (“If a court 
concludes that a plaintiff has ‘artfully pleaded’ claims [by failing to plead a necessary federal question], 
it may uphold removal even though no federal question appears on the face of the plaintiff’s complaint. 
The artful pleading doctrine allows removal where federal law completely preempts a plaintiff’s state-
law claim.”). 
 99. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005); see also Louisiana 
ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418, 424 (5th Cir. 2008); S. Rep. No. 109–14, at 35 (2005), 
as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 34 (Congress emphasized that term class action should be defined 
broadly to prevent jurisdictional gamesmanship); Edward S. Sledge, IV & Christopher S. Randolph, 
Jr., Setting the Edges: Defending Against Plaintiff End Runs Around CAFA, 80 Def. Couns. J. 178, 
184 (2013) (“Congress specifically mentioned damage stipulations as an example of jurisdictional 
gamesmanship that it sought to end.”). 
 100. See Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2009) (addressing argument that 
plaintiffs should not be allowed to “game” jurisdiction statutes by filing copycat cases). 
 101. See Ethington v. Gen. Elec. Co., 575 F. Supp. 2d 855, 863 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (noting the 
“growing trend of district courts wrestling with this latest litigation fad”). 
 102. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2012). 
 103. Ethington, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 862. 
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a similar kind of gamesmanship from defendants” in instances such as 
the case at bar. In other words, “a literal interpretation of the provision 
creates an opportunity for gamesmanship by defendants, which could 
not have been the intent of the legislature in drafting the ‘properly 
joined and served’ language.”104 
The Court’s preoccupation with litigation gamesmanship extends 
not only to actual practices, but to fear of potential gambits as well 
(which the Court has signaled it wishes to nip in the bud). Thus, the 
Court’s decision in Owens Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger105 
represents perhaps one of the strangest judicial overreactions to 
potential gamesmanship. There, the Court held that the doctrine of 
supplemental jurisdiction could not be extended to permit assertion of 
jurisdiction over a nondiverse party that was impleaded and sued in a 
defendant’s cross-claim. 
This exception to supplemental jurisdiction seemingly was predicated 
on the quasi-absurd theory that the judicial system had an interest in 
preventing a plaintiff from colluding with a defendant to subsequently 
implead and assert a cross-claim against a nondiverse party whom the 
plaintiff could not have sued originally, thereby gaining jurisdiction over 
that party through assertion of supplemental jurisdiction.106 The Owen 
exception, designed to head off this type of prospective gamesmanship, is 
now codified in the supplemental jurisdiction statute.107 
The Court’s concern with litigant forum shopping to gain advantage 
is, of course, similarly manifested in its applicable law decisions. Thus, the 
Court in Ferens—reflecting on its precedential Van Dusen ruling—
explained:  
Van Dusen also sought to fashion a rule that would not create 
opportunities for forum shopping. Some commentators have seen this 
policy as the most important rationale of Van Dusen, but few attempt to 
explain the harm of forum shopping when the plaintiff initiates a transfer. 
An opportunity for forum shopping exists  whenever a party has a choice 
of forums that will apply different laws. The Van Dusen policy against 
 
 104. Id. (citing Allen v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, No. 07-5045, 2008 WL 2247067, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 
May 30, 2008)); Brown v. Organon Int’l., Inc., No. 07-3092(HAA), 2008 WL 2833294, at *5 (D.N.J. 
July 21, 2008) (“To apply the ‘properly joined and served’ language literally where an in-state defendant 
removes, would promote the same type of litigant gamesmanship that the rule seeks to limit, and thus 
violate the clear purpose of the legislative provision.”); DeAngelo-Shuayto v. Organon USA Inc., No. 
07-2923(SRC),  2007 WL 4365311, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2007). 
 105. 437 U.S. 365 (1978). 
 106. Id. at 374 (“The limits upon federal jurisdiction, whether imposed by the Constitution or by 
Congress, must be neither disregarded nor evaded. Yet under the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in 
this case, a plaintiff could defeat the statutory requirement of complete diversity by the simple expedient 
of suing only those defendants who were of diverse citizenship and waiting for them to implead non-
diverse defendants.”); see also id. at 374–75 n.17 (explaining “this is not an unlikely hypothesis,” but that 
“the requirement of complete diversity would be eviscerated by such a course of conduct”). 
 107. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (2012); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 
U.S. 546, 573 (2005) (noting § 1367(b) codified the Owen rule). 
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forum shopping simply requires us to interpret § 1404(a) in a way that 
does not create an opportunity for obtaining a more favorable law by 
selecting a forum through a transfer of venue. In the Van Dusen case 
itself, this meant that we could not allow defendants to use a transfer to 
change the law.108 
Finally, judicial antipathy towards litigation gamesmanship extends 
to an array of postfiling attorney behavior. Thus, in particular, courts 
have criticized strategic gamesmanship during discovery proceedings,109 
strategic motion practice intended to cause unnecessary delay,110 and the 
filing of frivolous motions for a similar purpose.111 Courts typically deal with 
these types of gamesmanship through sanctioning powers under the 
federal rules,112 federal statutes,113 or through exercise of the court’s 
inherent powers.114 It might be noted that, similar to other judicial 
attempts to curb litigation gamesmanship, discovery practice especially 
has proven entirely resistant to repeated efforts to deal with alleged 
discovery abuse. Hence, the discovery provisions may claim the dubious 
honor as the federal rules most repeatedly amended in efforts to restrain 
litigation gamesmanship.115 
 
 108. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 527 (citing 19 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 4506 (2d ed. 1982); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 636 (1964)). 
 109. See, e.g., Digital Ally, Inc. v. Z3 Tech., LLC, No. 09-2292-KGS, 2012 WL 2402771, at *2 
(D. Kan. June 26, 2012) (“The purpose of discovery and initial disclosures is to avoid one side ambushing 
the other, and the litigants should not indulge in gamesmanship with respect to their disclosure 
obligations.”); Inland Am. (LIP) SUB, LLC v. Lauth, No. 1:09-CV-00839-SEB-JMS, 2010 WL 670546, 
at * 2 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 19, 2010) (“Defendant’s request for a stay of discovery smacks of the type of 
gamesmanship that has no place in litigation in federal court.”); cf. Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 
606 F.2d 704, 710 (7th Cir. 1979) (disapproving of trial court procedures that promote “gamesmanship 
aspects of litigation”). See generally Enoch, supra note 87 (citing examples). 
 110. See generally Enoch, supra note 87 (citing cases and example). 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (pleading sanctions); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 (discovery sanctions); Digital 
Ally, 2012 WL 2402771, at *3 (“Rule 37(c) is designed to prevent the ‘sandbagging’ of an opposing 
party with new evidence and prevent gamesmanship.”); CSC Holdings, Inc. v. Berube, No. 01-1650 
DRH MLO, 2004 WL 3541331, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 7, 2004) (“Rule 37(c)(1) is designed to avoid” 
gamesmanship and “‘to provide a strong inducement for disclosure of Rule 26(a) material.’” (citing 
Hein v. Cuprum, 53 Fed. Appx. 134, 136 (2d Cir. 2002))). 
 113. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012) (providing for sanctions for attorneys who unreasonably and 
vexatious multiple proceedings). 
 114. See generally Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (discussing inherent power of the 
courts to sanction attorneys). 
 115. See generally Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of 
the U.S., Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy and Civil Procedure 
(2013), available at https://web.archive.org/web/20131029053101/http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
rules/preliminary-draft-proposed-amendments.pdf (the proposed amendments would revise Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 26, 30, 31, 33, 34, 36, and 37). 
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B. Forum-Selection Clauses: Muddled Jurisprudence 
As we have seen, federal courts eschew various litigant tactics 
intended to game the system, with forum shopping and creative 
manipulation of federal jurisdiction at the top of this list followed closely 
by gambits to secure preferable law. A reframing of the problem of 
forum-selection clauses (as well as choice-of-law provisions and arbitration 
clauses) is through the lens of litigation gamesmanship, rather than 
contract law. The Court’s evolving forum-selection clause jurisprudence, 
then, invites such one-sided gamesmanship. 
A not insignificant problem with forum-selection clause jurisprudence, 
which opens the door to such gamesmanship, is that it embraces a 
complicated tangle of principles that vary according to different contexts. 
This tangle works to the advantage of prospective corporate defendants 
who, knowledgeable of these principles and their consequences, exploit 
forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses to their advantage. 
Thus, if harm occurs at sea, the litigation arises in the court’s 
admiralty jurisdiction and principles of federal common law from The 
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. apply to assess the validity and 
enforceability of a forum-selection clause.116 The Court’s Zapata decision 
indicates that forum-selection clauses in the admiralty context are prima 
facie or presumptively valid and should be enforced unless the resisting 
party demonstrates that enforcement of the clause would be 
“‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances.”117 In discussing the possible 
unreasonableness of a forum-selection clause, the Zapata majority 
embraced contract unconscionability analysis. Thus, the Court suggested 
that a forum-selection clause was not unreasonable if it was “unaffected 
by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power,” and 
therefore should be given legal effect.118 These Zapata unconscionability 
principles, then, apply to determine the enforceability of forum-selection 
clauses in cases arising in admiralty jurisdiction for harms occurring at sea. 
Litigation that arises from land-based harm, on the other hand, 
generally invokes the court’s diversity jurisdiction where the party 
seeking to enforce the clause urges transfer to another state or foreign 
court. Until the Court decided Atlantic Marine, courts disagreed upon 
whether federal common law or Erie principles applied, requiring 
recourse to state contract law to interpret the validity and enforceability 
of the clause.119 It is unclear whether the Atlantic Marine decision has 
 
 116. See generally The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
 117. Id. at 10 (“We believe this is the correct doctrine to be followed by federal district courts 
sitting in admiralty. It is merely the other side of the proposition recognized by this Court in National 
Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent.” (citing 375 U.S. 311 (1964))). 
 118. Id. at 12–13. 
 119. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text. 
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definitively resolved this debate in favor of exclusive application of 
federal common law principles, but it would seem so.120 Justice Scalia did 
not think this was correct in his Stewart dissent, and several lower federal 
courts agreed that the Erie doctrine mandates application of state 
contract law to resolve these questions.121 
Nonetheless, the Court in Atlantic Marine recognized that the 
invocation of a forum-selection clause in nonadmiralty cases presented a 
different litigation scenario. Thus, in these contexts, having determined 
that § 1404(a) is the appropriate procedural means for enforcing a 
forum-selection clause, the Court explained: 
[T]he appropriate way to enforce a forum-selection clause pointing to a 
state or foreign forum is through the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens. Section 1404(a) is merely a codification of the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens for the subset of cases in which the transferee 
forum is within the federal court system; in such cases, Congress has 
replaced the traditional remedy of outright dismissal with transfer.122 
It would seem, then, that post-Atlantic Marine, one set of principles 
apply to forum-selection clause cases arising in the admiralty context, 
which permit (if not require) some reference to contract unconscionability 
analysis, but another set of principles apply to land-based forum-
selection cases, which are subjected to a now restricted forum non 
conveniens analysis. Indeed, in its cribbed description of what constitutes 
a forum non conveniens analysis under § 1404(a) in these cases, the 
Atlantic Marine decision seems to have eliminated recourse to contract 
unconscionability arguments. 
The complicated forum-selection clause interpretive landscape is 
not limited to the simple dichotomy between sea-based or land-based 
harms, with distinctions arising from admiralty, diversity, or federal question 
jurisdiction. Forum-selection clause jurisprudence is further complicated 
by the presence or absence of a choice-of-law provision,123 whether the 
 
 120. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 579–81 (2013).  
 121. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text. 
 122. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 580 (citing Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 
U.S. 422, 430 (2007)). 
 123. See, e.g., Brenner v. Nat’l Outdoor Leadership Sch., No. 13-02908 (DSD/JJG), 2014 WL 
2069364, at *5 (D. Minn. May 19, 2014) (“In a transfer analysis, ‘a district court . . . must decide 
whether the [forum-selection] clause applies to the type of claims asserted in the lawsuit.’” (quoting 
Terra Int’l, Inc. v. Mississippi Chem. Corp., 119 F.3d 688, 692 (8th Cir. 1997))). Thus, the court 
interprets the forum-selection clause to determine its applicability to the instant dispute. Although 
enforceability of a forum-selection clause is analyzed under federal law, where there exist both valid 
forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses, the substantive law identified in the choice-of-law clause 
governs interpretation of the forum-selection clause. See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581 (holding the 
lower court “erred in failing to make the adjustments required . . . when the transfer motion is premised 
on a forum-selection clause”); Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 220 (2nd Cir. 2014) (“[C]ourts 
must apply the law contractually chosen by the parties to interpret the [forum-selection] clause.”). But 
see Schwan’s Sales Enters., Inc. v. SIG Pack, Inc., 476 F.3d 594, 596–97 (8th Cir. 2007); Martinez, 740 
F.3d at 214 (“[W]here a contract contains both a valid choice-of-law clause and a forum selection clause, 
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forum-selection clause is mandatory or permissive,124 and whether the 
forum-selection clause involves international commercial transactions.125 
Moreover, since Zapata, the Court’s forum-selection clause 
jurisprudence has arced towards a unified theory of federalized forum-
selection clause law, with ever more restrictive pronouncements 
narrowing the ability of an opposing party to successfully challenge such 
provisions. Thus, the Court has consistently refused to distinguish among 
parties to litigation, applying the same principles to cases involving 
uninformed and unsophisticated consumers as to cases involving 
sophisticated business entities on both sides of a contract.126 
C. Arbitration Clauses: Another Variation on the Theme of 
Gaming the System 
Finally, the Court in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.127 analogized 
arbitration clauses to forum-selection clauses, declaring, “[a]n agreement 
to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a specialized kind of 
forum-selection clause that posits not only the situs of suit but also the 
procedure to be used in resolving the dispute.”128 Scherk was decided 
two terms after Zapata, and the Court simply transposed Zapata’s 
reasoning and conclusions onto arbitration clauses. Thus, in lockstep 
with Zapata, the Court noted that a forum-selection clause should 
control absent a strong showing that it should be set aside and that the 
elimination of forum uncertainty by agreeing to a forum in advance “is 
an indispensable element in international trade, commerce, and 
contracting.”129 
 
the substantive law identified in the choice-of-law clause governs the interpretation of the forum 
selection clause, while federal law governs the enforceability of the forum selection clause . . . .”). 
 124. See, e.g., Montoya v. Fin. Fed. Credit, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1263–64 (D.N.M. 2012) 
(“The difference between a mandatory and permissive forum selection clause is that ‘[m]andatory 
forum selection clauses contain clear language showing that jurisdiction is appropriate only in the 
designated forum. In contrast, permissive forum selection clauses authorize jurisdiction in a designated 
forum, but do not prohibit litigation elsewhere.’” (quoting Am. Soda, LLP v. U.S. Filter Wastewater Grp., 
428 F.3d 921, 926–27 (10th Cir. 2005))). Hence, before determining what law applies to determine the 
validity and enforceability of a forum-selection clause, several courts have indicated that a threshold 
inquiry involves deciding whether a forum-selection clause is mandatory or permissive. 
 125. See generally The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
 126. Id. (enforcing forum-selection clause in the context of two sophisticated business entities 
contractually agreeing to a foreign forum); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) 
(enforcing a forum-selection clause against consumers who purchased cruise line ticket). 
 127. 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 518 (quoting Zapata, 407 U.S. at 13–14); see also id. at 516 (“A contractual provision 
specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall be litigated and the law to be applied is, 
therefore, an almost indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability 
essential to any international business transaction.”). 
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Three points are compelling about the Scherk decision, in which the 
contested clause specified that any breach of the parties’ contractual 
agreement would be referred to arbitration before the International 
Chamber of Commerce in Paris.130 First, when Alberto-Culver, respondent, 
sought to sue over disputed trademark issues, the Court upheld the 
arbitration clause designating Paris as the forum based on the Court’s 
Zapata reasoning. However, the Court also indicated that Illinois state 
law would govern the dispute,131 because that state’s law also was 
designated in the contract. The Court rendered this opinion without any 
reflection on the threshold issue of what law applied to determine the 
validity and enforceability of the choice-of-law provision, and it seems 
odd to enforce a Paris forum but dictate application of Illinois state 
law.132 
Second, in exact contrast to the theme of this Article, the Scherk 
Court determined that enforcement of arbitration clauses was desirable 
because enforcement of these provisions would eliminate parties’ 
attempts to game the system. Thus, the Court noted, “[a] parochial refusal 
by the courts of one country to enforce an international arbitration 
agreement would not only frustrate these purposes, but would invite 
unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to secure 
tactical litigation advantages.”133 As will be discussed, forum-selection 
 
 130. Id. at 508. 
 131. Id. at 519 n.13 (“Under some circumstances, the designation of arbitration in a certain place might 
also be viewed as implicitly selecting the law of that place to apply to that transaction. In this case, however, 
‘[t]he laws of the State of Illinois’ were explicitly made applicable by the arbitration agreement.”). 
 132. Summarizing the Supreme Court’s arbitration clause jurisprudence in several cases following 
Scherk, the Eleventh Circuit concluded: 
Together, these Supreme Court precedents propound several overarching themes: 
(1) courts should apply a strong presumption in favor of enforcement of arbitration and 
choice clauses; (2) U.S. statutory claims are arbitrable, unless Congress has specifically 
legislated otherwise; (3) choice-of-law clauses may be enforced even if the substantive law 
applied in arbitration potentially provides reduced remedies (or fewer defenses) than those 
available under U.S. law; and (4) even if a contract expressly says that foreign law governs, 
. . . courts should not invalidate an arbitration agreement at the arbitration-enforcement 
stage on the basis of speculation about what the arbitrator will do, as there will be a later 
opportunity to review any arbitral award. 
Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257, 1269 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 133. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 517. The Court explained how the parties, in the absence of an arbitration 
clause, might game the system: 
In the present case, for example, it is not inconceivable that if Scherk had anticipated that 
Alberto-Culver would be able in this country to enjoin resort to arbitration he might have 
sought an order in France or some other country enjoining Alberto-Culver from proceeding 
with its litigation in the United States. Whatever recognition the courts of this country might 
ultimately have granted to the order of the foreign court, the dicey atmosphere of such a 
legal no-man’s-land would surely damage the fabric of international commerce and trade, 
and imperil the willingness and ability of businessmen to enter into international 
commercial agreements. 
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clauses and arbitration clauses may be viewed in exactly the opposite 
fashion: as a means of unilateral jockeying to secure tactical litigation 
advantage, which the Scherk majority eschewed. 
Third, in analogizing arbitration clauses to forum-selection clauses 
in reliance on Zapata, the Court adopted Zapata’s standards for 
determining the validity and enforceability of arbitration clauses, as well. 
Thus, a set of contract principles set forth in an admiralty case were 
engrafted onto an arbitration clause in a land-based international 
commercial dispute.134 But whether an arbitration clause constituted a 
contract of adhesion was an issue for the arbitral tribunal, not the court 
in which the clause was challenged.135 
Scherk was a five-to-four decision. With significant prescience for 
the subsequent evolution of forum-selection and arbitration clauses, the 
Court’s four liberal Justices recognized the unfairness of transposing 
Zapata rationales to arbitration clauses and objected to the Court’s 
sweeping endorsement of Zapata in the international arbitration context: 
This invocation of the “international contract” talisman might be 
applied to a situation where, for example, an interest in a foreign 
company or mutual fund was sold to an utterly unsophisticated 
American citizen, with material fraudulent misrepresentations made in 
this country. The arbitration clause could appear in the fine print of a 
form contract, and still be sufficient to preclude recourse to our courts, 
forcing the defrauded citizen to arbitration in Paris to vindicate his 
rights.136 
Notwithstanding this dissent, numerous courts post-Scherk and its 
progeny have invoked Scherk to uphold arbitration clauses in international 
 
Id. 
 134. The Eleventh Circuit summarized the Zapata “test” as holding that forum-selection clauses 
are presumptively valid unless: 
(1) their formation was induced by fraud or overreaching; (2) the plaintiff effectively would 
be deprived of its day in court because of the inconvenience or unfairness of the chosen 
forum; (3) the fundamental unfairness of the chosen law would deprive the plaintiff of a 
remedy; or (4) enforcement of such provisions would contravene a strong public policy. 
Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1296 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 135. See, e.g., JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 170 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding issue 
of contract unconscionability was question for the arbitral tribunal to determine). 
 136. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 529 (Douglas, J., concurring and dissenting). 
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commercial contracts,137 and expanded these international commercial 
holdings to domestic arbitration clauses, as well.138 
Given the trajectory of forum-selection clause jurisprudence, it was 
perhaps inevitable that Zapata principles eventually would be engrafted 
from the international arbitration commercial context onto the domestic 
consumer arbitration arena. Thus, in the latest expansion of the reach of 
forum-selection clause doctrine, the Court determined that the Federal 
Arbitration Act preempts application of state unconscionability 
jurisprudence—in this case, California state law.139 In this regard, forum-
selection and arbitration clause jurisprudence essentially have converged 
into the same highly restrictive and anti-consumer doctrine embodied in 
the Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute line of cases. 
Finally, it is well to consider whether, post-Atlantic Marine, there 
are lingering procedural issues regarding the appropriate means to seek 
enforcement of an arbitration clause. Thus, in an Atlantic Marine echo-
chamber, some courts have considered requests to compel arbitration on a 
Rule 12(b)(6) or a Rule 56 summary judgment motion, with the remedy 
either a stay of proceedings or outright dismissal of the case.140 Other 
defendants have moved for enforcement of an arbitration provision 
under a Rule 12(b)(1) motion for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction,141 
or a Rule 12(b)(3) motion for a lack of venue.142 
 
 137. See, e.g., Lindo, 652 F.3d at 1275 (“[U]nder . . . Supreme Court and Circuit precedent, there is 
a strong presumption in favor of freely-negotiated contractual choice-of-law and forum-selection 
provisions, and this presumption applies with special force in the field of international commerce.”); 
see also JLM Indus., 387 F.3d at 171 (“Moreover, as our Court has recently repeated, we are mindful 
that ‘[t]he federal policy favoring the liberal enforcement of arbitration clauses . . . applies with particular 
force in international disputes.’” (quoting Paramedics Electromedicina Comercial, Ltda. v. GE Med. 
Sys. Info. Techs., Inc., 369 F.3d 645, 654 (2d Cir. 2004))). 
 138. See, e.g., Huffman v. Hilltop Companies, 747 F.3d 391 (6th Cir. 2014) (enforcing arbitration 
clause in employment litigation based on the Fair Labor Standards Act violations); Awuah v. Coverall N. 
Am., Inc., 703 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2012) (requiring franchise to arbitrate claims against franchisor where 
arbitrator clause was referenced only in other agreements); Gore v. Alltel Commc’ns LLC, 666 F.3d 1027 
(7th Cir. 2012) (holding consumer fraud claim, among others, was subject to arbitration; whether an 
arbitration clause was procedurally unconscionable was a question for arbitrator in the first instance). 
 139. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
 140. See, e.g., Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., 716 F.3d 764, 771 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(holding district court should employ Rule 56 summary judgment standards when considering a 
motion to compel arbitration); Palcko v. Airborne Express, Inc., 372 F.3d 588, 597 (3rd Cir. 2004) 
(considering motion to compel arbitration under Rule 12(b)(6) standard); Kaneff v. Del. Title Loans, 
Inc., 587 F.3d 616, 620 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 141. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). 
 142. See, e.g., Faulkenber v. CB Tax Franchise Sys., LP, 637 F.3d 801, 807 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding 
Rule 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss for improper venue is appropriate means to seek enforcement of an 
arbitration clause provision); Lim v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc., 404 F.3d 898, 902 (5th Cir. 
2004) (“Although circuits are split on the issue of whether Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(3) is the proper 
motion for seeking dismissal based on a forum selection or arbitration clause, . . . neither side has 
substantively briefed the merits of the question. Because our court has accepted Rule 12(b)(3) as a 
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Thus, one wonders what procedural effect Atlantic Marine has on 
the enforcement of arbitration clauses. The Court in Atlantic Marine 
determined that the appropriate procedural means for effectuating a 
forum-selection clause is through a § 1404(a) transfer motion, applying 
forum non conveniens analysis. But this conclusion has scant applicability 
to the presence of an arbitration agreement in a party’s contractual 
relationship because federal courts lack the power to transfer a case to an 
arbitral tribunal. 
Hence, enforcement of an arbitration provision must be accomplished 
through some procedural vehicle other than a § 1404 transfer motion, 
and subject to some other prevailing jurisprudential standards. In a post-
Atlantic Marine decision, the Seventh Circuit suggested that “[a]n 
arbitration clause is simply a type of forum-selection clause, and a 
motion seeking dismissal based on an agreement to arbitrate therefore 
should be decided under Rule 12(b)(3).”143 How does this conclusion, 
then, square with the Atlantic Marine analysis that forum-selection clauses 
are not a matter of venue? 
III.  Forum-Selection Clauses in Consumer Contracts  
Post- ATLANTIC MARINE 
A. A Reprise on Gaming the System 
1. What Zapata Hath Wrought 
In this post-Atlantic Marine era, one may trace a daisy chain of legal 
authority essentially derived from Zapata and extending through AT&T 
v. Concepcion. Thus, what originated as a doctrine in the context of 
admiralty law in a dispute arising between sophisticated international 
businesspersons has been transmuted over the decades into a narrowly 
restrictive doctrine of presumptive validity of forum-selection and 
arbitration clauses in consumer and nonconsumer contracts. Moreover, 
the doctrine has embraced some peculiar eddies, such as the Burger King 
Corp. v. Rudzewicz decision where Burger King was able to sue its 
franchisees in a Florida forum based not on a forum-selection clause, but 
solely on a choice-of-law clause.144 
 
proper method for seeking dismissal based on a forum selection clause, we need not decide whether a 
Rule 12(b)(1) motion would be appropriate.” (citation omitted)). 
 143. Johnson v. Orkin, LLC, 556 F. App’x 543, 544 (7th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 
 144. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 481–82 (1985) (holding choice-of-law clause 
designating application of Florida law placed franchisees on notice that disputes arising from franchise 
agreement would be litigated in a Florida forum). In nearly thirty-five years of teaching the Burger King 
decision, I have yet to find students with sympathy for Rudzewicz and MacShara, the franchisees, who 
arguably fail to qualify as sophisticated businesspersons precisely because their Burger King franchise 
failed. 
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In recent years, the tentacles of forum-selection clause doctrine have 
reached further and further—beyond nautical disasters, international 
commercial trade agreements, domestic cruise line passengers—and 
eventually ensnared domestic commercial agreements, ordinary consumer 
contracts, employment agreements, brokerage agreements, and basically 
any arrangement governed by contract. Moreover, once the Supreme 
Court announced that arbitration clauses were a kind of forum-selection 
clause, the courts easily embraced forum-selection clause jurisprudence 
as applicable to arbitration clauses. Thus, the ultimate evolution of 
Zapata jurisprudence was crowned in the Court’s Concepcion decision, 
which accorded primacy to federal arbitration law as preempting state 
unconscionability doctrine.145 
The law of forum-selection and arbitration clause jurisprudence 
might be summed up as follows: 
(1) If a disaster occurs at sea in a contract governed by a forum-
selection clause, one might be able to prevail against a forum-selection 
clause on unconscionability grounds, but probably not; where the 
parties most likely were sophisticated businesspersons, the clause is 
prima facie valid unless shown unreasonable; hence, the challenger will 
lose; 
(2) If a dispute arises as a consequence of an international 
commercial transaction (land-based), one might be able to prevail 
against a forum-selection clause on unconscionability grounds, but 
probably not; where the parties were sophisticated businesspersons the 
clause is prima facie valid unless shown unreasonable; hence, the 
challenger will lose; 
(3) If a dispute arises as a consequence of a domestic commercial 
dispute (land-based), one may challenge a forum-selection clause 
which, if presumptively valid as between sophisticated businesspersons 
will be subject to a § 1404(a) transfer, pursuant to forum non 
conveniens analysis, but no private right factors may be taken into 
account, only limited public law factors; hence, the challenger will lose; 
(4) If a dispute arises as a consequence of the presence of a 
forum-selection clause in a passenger ticket, one may challenge a 
forum-selection clause which, if presumptively valid, will be subject to a 
§ 1404(a) transfer, pursuant to forum non conveniens analysis, but no 
private right factors may be taken into account, only limited public law 
factors; hence, the challenger will lose, and it will be of no consequence 
that the corporation was sophisticated and the passenger was not; 
(5) If a dispute arises as a consequence of the presence of a 
forum-selection clause in a consumer contract (employment 
agreement, brokerage agreement, etc.), one may challenge a forum-
selection clause which, if presumptively valid, will be subject to a 
§ 1404(a) transfer, pursuant to forum non conveniens analysis, but no 
private right factors may be taken into account, only limited public law 
factors; hence, the challenger will lose, and it will be of no consequence 
 
 145. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
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that the corporation was sophisticated and the consumer had no idea 
what was going on; 
(6) If a dispute arises and the contract contains an arbitration 
clause, a defendant may seek to enforce the arbitration clause under 
Rule 12(b)(1), 12(b)(3), 12(b)(6) or Rule 56; federal law overrides any 
countervailing state contract unconscionability principles, thereby 
providing presumptive enforcement to the arbitration provision; the 
determination of the validity of the arbitration clause is within the 
purview of the arbitral tribunal; effectively the challenger will lose, if 
the arbitration clause was between sophisticated businesspersons in the 
international or domestic commercial markets; and it will be of no 
consequence that the corporation was sophisticated and the consumer 
had no idea what was going on. 
If one sifts through the thousands of reported federal forum-
selection clause decisions since Zapata—and there are thousands of such 
decisions146—one cannot help but be struck by the following fact: in 
virtually every case the party seeking enforcement of the clause wins, and 
the party seeking to invalidate the clause loses. This reality applies with 
equal force and consequence to arbitration clauses since Scherk.147 Thus, 
the doctrinal bar to prevailing on an unconscionability objection to a 
forum-selection or arbitration clause is so great as to render that 
challenge practically moot. In the realm of forum-selection and 
arbitration clauses, the primacy of contract law prevails and the 
possibility of invalidating such clauses on unconscionability grounds 
largely remains illusory. 
2. Zapata’s First Premises: On Public Policy and Ousting a Court’s 
Jurisdiction 
As indicated above, current forum-selection and arbitration clause 
jurisprudence chiefly derives from Zapata and its progeny, where the 
Court reversed the historical aversion to forum-selection clauses.148 The 
Zapata Court noted that federal and state courts had refused to enforce 
such clauses on two primary grounds: (1) the clauses were contrary to 
public policy, and (2) the effect of such clauses was to oust courts of their 
jurisdiction.149 Adopting a “modern” view, the Court pivoted to 
announce that forum-selection clauses were prima facie valid and 
 
 146. Search Results for “Forum-Selection Clause”, WestlawNext, http://www.westlawnext.com 
(search “adv: ‘forum-selection clause’ & DA (aft 06-12-1972)” in “All Federal” category; click “cases”) 
(reporting 9987 case citations as of Feb. 2, 2014). 
 147. Search Results for “Enforce Arbitration Clause”, WestlawNext, 
http://www.westlawnext.com (search: “adv: ‘enforce arbitration clause’ & DA (aft 06-12-1972)” in “All 
Federal” category; click “cases”). 
 148. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972) (“Forum-selection clauses have 
historically not been favored by American courts.”). 
 149. Id. 
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enforceable unless the challenging party could show that the clause was 
unreasonable under the circumstances.150 
Several points are noteworthy in relation to the subsequent vast 
expansion of Zapata principles. Regarding the underlying facts, the 
Zapata Court’s repudiation of prior forum-selection clause jurisprudence 
was limited to the admiralty context of that case.151 In addition, the Court 
embraced its new forum-selection clause doctrine because the case arose 
in the setting of an international commercial transaction that involved 
sophisticated businesspersons on both sides of the contract.152 The Court 
especially noted that its decision was supported by “present-day 
commercial realities and expanding international trade,” and the fact 
that “the elimination of all such uncertainties by agreeing in advance on 
a forum acceptable to both parties is an indispensable element of 
international trade.”153 Notwithstanding this limited factual context, the 
Court expanded these rationales to embrace cruise line passenger tickets 
in Carnival Cruise Lines—another admiralty jurisdiction case—enlarging 
the reach of forum-selection clause jurisprudence to consumer 
contracts.154 
The Zapata Court’s legal rationales also bear scrutiny. The Court 
analogized its new position on forum-selection clauses as equivalent to 
parties’ consensual waiver of notice.155 The problem, however, is that 
service of process has always been a waivable defense,156 while the same 
cannot be said for subject matter jurisdiction, which is not consensually 
waivable by the parties.157 To reach the conclusion that subject matter 
jurisdiction is not waived by virtue of a forum-selection clause one must 
first conclude that such clauses are not jurisdictional, as many courts 
have so decided.158 
 
 150. Id. at 10. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 10–11. 
 153. Id. at 13, 15. 
 154. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594–95 (1991). 
 155. Zapata, 407 U.S. at 10–11 (citing Nat’l Equip Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964)). 
 156. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1)–(2); Royster v. Mohr, No. 2:11-CV-1163, 2013 WL 2404065, at *2 
(S.D. Ohio May 31, 2013) (“The waivable defenses listed in Rule 12(b)(2)–(5) are lack of personal 
jurisdiction, improper venue, insufficient process, and insufficient service of process.”). 
 157. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); 5C Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 1393 (3d ed. 2004) (“The final defense expressly preserved against waiver as expressly set 
forth in Federal Rule 12(h)(3), is a challenge to the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. . . . 
[T]he federal courts have made it clear beyond peradventure that not only is it impossible to foreclose 
the assertion of this defense by the passage of time or the notion of estoppel, but also it is impossible 
to cure or waive a defect of subject matter jurisdiction by consent of the parties.”). 
 158. See, e.g., Auto. Mechs. Local 701 Welfare & Pension Funds v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, 
502 F.3d 740, 743 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Enforcement of a forum selection clause (including an arbitration 
clause) is not jurisdictional; it is a waivable defense . . . .”); Nat’l Renal Alliance, LLC v. GAIA 
Healthcare Sys., LLC, No. 3:10-0872, 2010 WL 4659804, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 9, 2010) (holding issue 
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The Zapata court further rejected the argument that a forum-
selection clause ousted a court of its jurisdiction based on the theory that 
the court exercised its jurisdiction to determine the validity and 
enforceability of the clause in the first instance. In rejecting the “ouster 
of jurisdiction” argument, the court explained: 
The argument that such clauses are improper because they tend to 
“oust” a court of jurisdiction is hardly more than a vestigial legal 
fiction. It appears to rest at core on historical judicial resistance to any 
attempt to reduce the power and business of a particular court and has 
little place in an era when all courts are overloaded and when 
businesses once essentially local now operate in world markets. It 
reflects something of a provincial attitude regarding the fairness of 
other tribunals. No one seriously contends in this case that the forum-
selection clause “ousted” the District Court of jurisdiction over 
Zapata’s action. The threshold question is whether that court should 
have exercised its jurisdiction to do more than give effect to the 
legitimate expectations of the parties, manifested in their freely 
negotiated agreement, by specifically enforcing the forum clause.159 
The Zapata Court’s facile rejection of the “ouster of jurisdiction” 
theory, however, suggests that perhaps that doctrine deserved a more 
decent burial. A long line of cases undergirded this theory, which 
traditionally was coupled with a recognition that forum-selection clauses 
were against public policy.160 The Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. Monrosa 
decision—repudiated by the Zapata Court—indicated: 
Contract provisions intended to oust courts of their jurisdiction in 
advance, as distinguished from provisions merely imposing conditions 
on the exercise of the right to sue, are void. This rule has been 
frequently considered in determining the validity of contracts as to 
venue, periods of limitation, notice or demand, and evidence.161  
The Carbon Black decision further noted that in England and the United 
States, it was settled law that a court’s jurisdiction could not be ousted by 
the private agreement of individuals made in advance, private persons 
were incompetent to make such binding contracts, and all such contracts 
were illegal and void as against public policy.162 
 
of forum-selection clause is an independent contractual concern created by the actions of the parties, 
and is not linked to the inherent subject matter jurisdiction of the court). 
 159. Zapata, 407 U.S. at 12. 
 160. See, e.g., Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300–01 (5th Cir. 1958) (finding 
forum-selection clause unenforceable; reiterating the traditional view of many American courts that 
“agreements in advance of controversy whose object is to oust the jurisdiction of the courts are 
contrary to public policy and will not be enforced”); Chemical Carriers, Inc. v. L. Smit & Co.’s 
Internationale Sleepdienst, 154 F. Supp. 886, 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (“Such agreements, particularly 
those calling for exclusive jurisdiction in a foreign court, are not looked upon with favor and will not 
be enforced by the Federal courts if they are unreasonable in themselves or in the effect they may 
have on the rights of the parties to the dispute.”). 
 161. Carbon Black Export, 254 F. 2d at 300–01 n.9. 
 162. Id. 
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However, in rejecting the “ouster of jurisdiction” theory, the Zapata 
Court did not altogether repudiate public policy challenges to forum-
selection clauses. Thus, the Court stated, “[a] contractual choice-of-
forum clause should be held unenforceable if enforcement would 
contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought, 
whether declared by statute or by judicial decision.”163 The Court further 
noted that “selection of a remote forum to apply differing foreign law to 
an essentially American controversy might contravene an important 
public policy of the forum.”164 
Zapata’s legacy has had a substantial impact on the evolving 
jurisprudence of forum-selection and arbitration clauses, not only with 
regard to the expansion of that decision’s scope, but also in terms of 
arguments lost. Thus, the Zapata Court effectively eliminated the “ouster 
of jurisdiction” argument from the forum-selection clause conversation. 
Moreover, public policy arguments have receded or failed to gain 
traction in subsequent cases. Finally, the Court’s Concepcion decision, 
giving primacy to federal arbitration law over countervailing state law,165 
hammered a definitive nail in the public policy coffin. 
B. The Need for Consumer Protection 
1. The Misguided Expansion to Consumer Agreements 
The impetus for a radical revision of forum-selection clause doctrine 
originated in the context of international shipping and transnational 
commercial transactions conducted between sophisticated contracting 
parties. Over time, the Court engrafted its revised doctrine onto any 
contractual arrangements entered into by anyone, embracing the realms 
of consumer and noncommercial contracts. In the Atlantic Marine decision, 
the Court further extended its forum-selection clause jurisprudence to 
conclude that by consensually agreeing to a forum-selection clause, a 
prospective plaintiff effectively has waived its forum “privilege,” thereby 
overriding the longstanding deference that courts have paid to a 
plaintiff’s choice of forum.166 
 
 163. Zapata, 407 U.S. at 15 (holding public policy was not offended by enforcement of the forum-
selection clause in that case). 
 164. Id. at 17. 
 165. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
 166. Atlantic Marine found that: 
[T]he plaintiff’s choice of forum merits no weight. Rather, as the party defying the forum-
selection clause, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that transfer to the forum for 
which the parties bargained is unwarranted. Because plaintiffs are ordinarily allowed to 
select whatever forum they consider most advantageous (consistent with jurisdictional and 
venue limitations), we have termed their selection the “plaintiff’s venue privilege.” But 
when a plaintiff agrees by contract to bring suit only in a specified forum—presumably in 
exchange for other binding promises by the defendant—the plaintiff has effectively 
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While the Court’s forum-selection clause jurisprudence carries force 
in its original international commercial context, the extension of these 
principles to ordinary consumer transactions is misguided, unprincipled, 
and ultimately unfair.167 The further expansion of these principles to the 
realm of arbitration clauses constitutes a one-two punch to unsuspecting 
consumers in their everyday lives. The Court accomplished this 
expansion of forum-selection and arbitration clause doctrine into the 
consumer arena in its Carnival Cruise Lines and Concepcion decisions.168 
The Court in Carnival Cruise Lines held that a forum-selection 
clause was dispositive of the jurisdictional issue and essentially was 
governed by principles articulated in Zapata.169 A seven-Justice majority 
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s view that a non-negotiated forum-selection 
clause in a form ticket is never enforceable simply because it does not 
result from bargaining.170 Instead, the Court suggested that forum-
selection clauses in consumer contracts should be subject to a refined 
Zapata test of reasonableness.171 
The Justices identified four reasons why the forum-selection clause 
in the cruise line ticket was reasonable. First, the provision limited the 
places where the cruise line could be sued, and, because ships travel to 
many locales, the cruise line had an interest in not being subjected to 
litigation in multiple forums.172 Second, such clauses eliminate confusion 
over the place of litigation, reducing litigation costs that might result 
from jurisdictional motions.173 Third, such clauses conserve judicial 
resources that might otherwise be devoted to deciding jurisdictional 
issues.174 And fourth, that “it stands to reason that passengers who 
purchase tickets containing a forum clause . . . benefit in the form of 
reduced fares reflecting the savings that the cruise line enjoys by limiting 
the fora in which it may be sued.”175 
The major policy reasons underlying the enforcement of forum-
selection clauses are that they ensure the certainty of the place of suit 
 
exercised its “venue privilege” before a dispute arises. Only that initial choice deserves 
deference, and the plaintiff must bear the burden of showing why the court should not 
transfer the case to the forum to which the parties agreed. 
Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581–82 (2013) (citing Van Dusen v. 
Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 635 (1964)). 
 167. See generally Mullenix, Another Easy Case, supra note 82; Mullenix, The Titanic of Worst 
Decisions, supra note 82. 
 168. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 169. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 590 (1991). This portion of the analysis 
is adapted from Mullenix, Another Easy Case, supra note 82, at 340–41. 
 170. Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 593. 
 171. Id. at 593–94. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
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and reduce cost and delay, thereby enhancing judicial administration. 
But as the thousands of reported forum-selection clause decisions 
suggest, this has simply proven not to be true.176 Instead, forum-selection 
clauses have contributed much litigation, great expense, and a good deal 
of delay, usually resulting in dismissal of the plaintiff’s case. Because the 
effect of these clauses is ultimately to make many plaintiffs’ cases go 
away, in that sense the provisions can be said to have a docket-clearing 
benefit. But why defendants should be given a preference in where they 
are sued is inexplicable and ultimately unjustifiable. 
The Court in Carnival Cruise Lines bolstered its extension of forum-
selection clause doctrine to consumer contracts by explaining that 
consumers enjoyed an economic pass-along of the benefits of these 
clauses. But to date, empirical studies have not demonstrated such 
economic pass-along to consumers, or how forum-selection clauses 
actually benefit consumers entrapped by what essentially constitutes a 
defendant’s unilateral forum preference. 
The entire doctrine surrounding the sanctity of forum-selection and 
arbitration clauses in the consumer arena essentially has been 
constructed based on a series of somewhat fantastical premises about 
these agreements. It first assumes that the contracting parties consist of a 
(sophisticated) consumer and a corporate or business entity. The 
doctrine assumes a knowledgeable consumer who understands that at 
some future point, the consumer may be involved in a dispute with the 
business entity. The doctrine assumes that this consumer understands 
what a forum choice means (or for that matter, what a choice-of-law or 
arbitration provision entails). It assumes that this consumer understands 
the consequences of a forum or choice-of-law designation. The doctrine 
assumes that the consumer has read the agreement and noticed and read 
the forum-selection, choice-of-law, or arbitration clause. The doctrine 
assumes that the consumer willingly agrees, in advance of any dispute, to 
waive its choice of forum (or choice of law, or access to the adjudicative 
system). The doctrine assumes that the consumer (or employee, or small 
consumer/investor) is receiving some unspecified economic benefit from 
agreeing to the forum-selection, choice-of-law, or arbitration provision. 
The doctrine assumes, as Justice Alito put it in Atlantic Marine, that the 
consumer knowingly and willingly waives its “venue privilege.”177 
But what if none of this—apart from the existence of contracting 
parties—is true? In the current age of computer-generated online 
contractual form agreements that require consumers to scroll through 
dozens of dense, small-print online boxes that allow for no modification 
or negotiation of terms, but then requires the consumer to “click Agree,” 
 
 176. See Mullenix, Another Easy Case, supra note 82, at 360. 
 177. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581–82 (2013). 
Mullenix-66.3.doc (Do Not Delete) 3/23/2015 5:08 PM 
April 2015]      GAMING THE SYSTEM 757 
it seems unreasonable to base enforcement of these clauses on the 
premise that a consumer could be said to knowingly and willingly have 
waived their venue privilege as a consequence. 
2. What Is to Be Done? 
In the consumer context, the evolution of forum-selection, choice-
of-law, and arbitration clause jurisprudence has resulted in a system that 
unfairly favors corporate defendants. This jurisprudence now extends 
beyond consumer contracts to all types of agreements, including 
employment and brokerage contracts. Because the Court has sanctified 
these provisions on the basis of contract law, there is no level playing 
field among contracting parties and corporate preferences for forum 
choice, applicable law, or alternative dispute resolution effectively 
prevail in all cases. 
As long as courts continue to construe these clauses in the context 
of contract law, consumers will continue to be vulnerable to corporate 
litigation manipulation in businesses’ favor. To resist or reject such 
manipulation requires revisiting discarded first principles: namely, 
whether forum-selection clauses are jurisdictional and whether they 
effectively oust courts of jurisdiction. As discussed above, federal courts 
historically have long resisted all manner of creative manipulation of 
jurisdiction, venue, and applicable law to game the litigation system for 
strategic advantage. Viewing forum-selection, choice-of-law, and arbitration 
clauses as creative means to manipulate jurisdiction under the cloak of 
contract law might result in a different judicial reception to these 
provisions. 
In addition, consumers would fare better with meaningful recourse 
to public policy arguments that eschew such provisions, arguments the 
courts have effectively eviscerated. The Court’s substantial federalization 
of applicable law relating to forum-selection and arbitration clauses has 
left little room for countervailing state law contravening such clauses, 
especially state law doctrines of contract unconscionability. However, 
given the Court’s increasingly severe jurisprudential arc regarding forum-
selection and arbitration clauses—as well as the Justices’ ideological 
predispositions—the likelihood of any federal doctrinal shift that is more 
sympathetic to consumers seems implausible. 
The procedural and substantive unfairness engendered by these 
clauses that affect the lives of consumers, employees, and others will not 
be remedied through doctrinal elaboration and cannot be remedied 
through rule amendments. If consumers are to be afforded meaningful 
relief from such clauses,178 then federal statutory substantive law is 
 
 178. See, e.g., The Cruise Industry Passenger Bill of Rights, Cruise Lines Int’l Ass’n, 
http://www.cruising.org/regulatory/issues-facts/safety-and-security/cruise-industry-passenger-bill-rights 
Mullenix-66.3.doc (Do Not Delete) 3/23/2015 5:08 PM 
758 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:719 
needed to determine the validity and enforcement of a forum-selection 
or choice-of-law clause challenged by a plaintiff179 or the validity and 
enforcement of an arbitration clause sought by a defendant. 
In this regard, the federal collusive joinder statute is a marvel of 
simplicity.180 It simply states, “[a] district court shall not have jurisdiction 
of a civil action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been 
improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of 
such court.” To address the growing problem of adhesive forum-selection 
(and similar) clauses, why can we not have a statute that simply states:  
A district court shall not have jurisdiction or venue of a civil action in 
which a party of superior bargaining strength has drafted, imposed, and 
made a contract of adhesion designing a particular forum, applicable 
law, or arbitration, relegating the subscribing party only to the 
opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it, and the clauses are 
unfairly one-sided.  
This type of statute would, at the outset, exclude from its purview 
Zapata-style cases arising in the international or domestic commercial 
contexts that involve sophisticated business partners on both sides of a 
deal. Instead, this statute would focus on the particular situations of 
consumer, employment, and brokerage contracts where one party has 
superior bargaining strength and the subscribing party is subjected to a 
take-it-or-leave contractual arrangement. 
In such cases, modifying the rules relating to presumptions and 
allocations of burdens of proof might also work towards leveling the 
playing field. Thus, in such situations, courts should not engage in a 
threshold presumption of validity favoring the provisions’ drafter; 
instead, such clauses should be presumptively invalid until shown to 
constitute an informed meeting of the minds and actual consensual 
agreement. Moreover, the party seeking enforcement should have the 
burden of demonstrating the validity and enforceability of these 
 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2015). This industry self-regulation was highly criticized for its failure to protect 
consumers from forum-selection clauses in passenger tickets. See Thomas A. Dickerson, The Cruise 
Passenger’s Rights and Remedies 2014: The Costa Concordia Disaster: One Year Later, Many More 
Incidents Both on Board Megaships and During Risky Shore Excursions, 38 Tul. Mar. L.J. 515, 526 
(2014) (“While superficially encouraging, the Passenger Bill of Rights promises little more than what 
cruise lines are already legally obligated to do and does nothing to level the litigation playing field, 
which is obstructed by roadblocks . . . . For example, if [the Cruise Line International Association 
(“CLIA”)] really wants to help cruise passengers, then cruise lines should stop inserting Miami, 
Florida, forum selection clauses into ticket contracts and allow injured passengers to sue in a forum 
convenient to them.”). 
 179. Senator Charles Schumer of New York, following CLIA’s announcement of its Industry 
Passenger Bill of Rights, indicated that he planned to introduce legislation to protect cruise line 
passengers. To date, no such legislation has been introduced. See Letter from Sen. Charles Schumer to 
Christine Duffy, CEO & President, Cruise Line Int’l Ass’n (Mar. 18, 2013), available at 
http://www.schumer.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=341068. 
 180. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (2012) (parties collusively joined or made). 
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provisions, rather than imposing contrary burdens on the party seeking 
to deny enforcement. This shifting of burdens is precisely the doctrine 
that courts apply when evaluating a plaintiff’s motion alleging 
impermissible collusive joinder under 28 U.S.C. § 1359.181 Finally, when a 
defendant seeks enforcement, the statute could be implemented on a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion—the procedural question that dominated the 
Atlantic Marine litigation. 
Conclusion 
Historically, Congress and the federal courts have acted to constrain 
or prevent prefiling actions by prospective litigants who intended to 
confer strategic litigation advantage if a dispute arose in the future. From 
the broadest prospective, our legal system has simultaneously encouraged 
zealous representation while at the same time eschewed certain types of 
litigation gamesmanship. In particular, legislative bodies and the courts 
have been sensitive to prefiling forum-shopping gambits designed to 
secure a preferable forum or applicable law. Consequently, many of the 
legislative or judicial initiatives to constrain such behaviors have been 
aimed at forum-shopping techniques in their varying and creative 
incarnations. 
The legislature and the judiciary have repeatedly intervened to 
thwart litigation gamesmanship. By statute, Congress has precluded 
individuals from engaging in sham contractual assignments to create 
federal jurisdiction and, in decedents’ estate cases, effectively ended the 
practice of appointing out-of-state executors to gain entry to federal 
court after a decedent’s demise. CAFA and the cases construing it 
represent a large-scale legislative and judicial effort to suppress forum-
shopping gamesmanship in the class action arena. By doctrinal 
pronouncements, courts have foiled plaintiffs’ attempts to gain litigation 
advantage through stratagems such as reincorporating over state lines to 
confer diversity jurisdiction or transferring litigation to gain preferable 
law in another venue. While many of these constraints have been directed 
 
 181. According to the District Court for the Southern District of New York:  
To rebut this presumption, the party invoking jurisdiction must “articulate a legitimate 
business purpose for the assignment,” . . . and bears a “heavy burden of proof.” Indeed, 
“simply offering evidence of a business reason will be insufficient to rebut the presumption. 
Instead, the burden falls on the party asserting diversity to demonstrate that the reason given 
for the assignment is legitimate, not pretextual.” . . . “In assessing whether an assignment is 
improper or collusive, courts consider, among other things, ‘the assignee’s lack of a previous 
connection with the claim assigned; the remittance by the assignee to the assignor of any 
recovery; whether the assignor actually controls the conduct of the litigation; the timing of the 
assignment; the lack of any meaningful consideration for the assignment; and the underlying 
purpose of the assignment.’”  
LCE Lux HoldCo S.a.r.l. v. Entretenimiento GM de Mexico S.A. de C.V., 287 F.R.D. 230, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (internal citations omitted). 
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at parties’ jurisdictional manipulation, the legislature and judiciary have 
similarly imposed limitations on venue manipulation. 
Most reform initiatives have been directed toward litigants’ prefiling 
actions intended to game the system. There is scant reason, however, not 
to apply such forum-shopping constraints on defendants’ prefiling actions 
where the prospective defendants’ purpose is similarly to game the 
system and accomplish the defendants’ preference for forum selection, 
applicable law, or arbitration. That is the practical effect of these clauses 
that corporate defendants routinely insert in consumer and employment 
contracts, which are enforced against largely unsuspecting and 
unsophisticated individuals. In the consumer arena, the expansion of 
forum-selection clause jurisprudence to arbitration clauses has exacerbated 
the inequity visited upon the vulnerable and conferred tremendous 
advantage on the business entities that customarily include such provisions 
in their contracts. 
The reality is that scarcely any plaintiff in the post-Zapata era who 
has sought to invalidate a forum-selection, choice-of-law, or arbitration 
clause has been able to successfully prevail on a contract unreasonableness 
defense. In a world where the Court has now announced that courts 
should give no weight to a plaintiff’s historical venue privilege as a 
consequence of the presence of a forum-selection clause, this doctrine 
instead unfairly confers a venue privilege on the contracting defendant. 
The imbalance of equities in forum-selection clause jurisprudence should 
be remedied by changing the narrative that gives primacy to contract law 
and returning the conversation to that of jurisdictional ouster, litigation 
gamesmanship, and public policy concerns. 
